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ABSTRACT 
One test of whether a scholarly work has achieved canonical status is 
to ask respected scholars in the field which works, setting aside their own, 
are essential reads. William Fletcher’s article, The Structure of Standing, 
now in its twenty-fifth year, would almost certainly emerge at the top of any 
such lists among standing scholars. And yet, while many at this conference 
have built upon Fletcher’s insights, there remains notable disagreement 
concerning standing doctrine’s normative foundations. The central dispute 
concerns whether standing doctrine should be celebrated as furthering a 
“private-rights” adjudicatory model, or instead, condemned as thwarting a 
“public-rights,” adjudicatory model. 
In a series of works employing social choice theory, I have presented 
standing doctrine as furthering a private-rights adjudicatory model. In 
separate high-profile works, Professors Heather Elliott and Jonathan 
Siegel have criticized this account, claiming it rests on the “great myth” 
that the judicial lawmaking is inextricably tied to dispute resolution, with 
precedent creation merely an incidental byproduct. Instead, Elliott and 
Siegel contend that the federal judiciary, including especially the Supreme 
Court, has the primary responsibility of announcing constitutional rules, 
with case resolutions a justificatory vehicle for performing that task. Siegel 
further maintains that if, as the social choice model suggests, standing 
raises the cost to ideological litigants of timing the path of case law to 
influence developing doctrine, it is no more effective than tossing a “few 
grains of sand” into the gears of the judicial-lawmaking apparatus. 
In this Article, I respond to these critiques and defend the social choice 
analysis of standing and the private-rights model on which it rests. First, 
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these and other public-rights scholars fail to appreciate that the private-
rights model enhances the normative legitimacy and durability of 
precedent. If the justification for creating precedent is the present 
favorable conditions of judicial staffing, then the arguments for respecting 
the resulting precedent erode when those conditions change, favoring those 
opposing the precedent. Second, these critiques misread the social choice 
model of standing to imply that relaxing its limiting conditions undermines 
the claim that with reasonable assumptions, even if there are no changes in 
Supreme Court staffing, the disposition of cases below, intervening 
precedent, and the jurisprudential views of sitting justices, ideological 
litigants can affect substantive doctrine through favorable case orderings. 
The opposite is true: relaxing these limiting conditions has the potential to 
enhance, not diminish, incentives to manipulate case orderings for maximal 
doctrinal effect. Third, and finally, expanding the social choice analysis to 
account for (1) delays in lower federal courts or state courts, (2) the results 
of changed judicial staffing on the Supreme Court, and (3) the bidirectional 
nature of constitutional and prudential standing rules more likely generates 
a “butterfly effect,” with substantial implications for developing doctrine, 
than an inconsequential tossing of sand into the works of developing 
precedent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One test of whether a scholarly work has achieved canonical status is to 
ask those writing in the field which works, setting their own aside, are 
essential reads.1 My own casual empiricism, corroborated by this very 
conference, suggests that William Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing2 
would almost certainly emerge at the top of any such lists among standing 
scholars. Indeed, if there is a reason to avoid calling Fletcher’s work a 
classic it is merely that even after twenty-five years, the article continues to 
be both praised and read.3 
Then-Professor William Fletcher was among the first legal scholars to 
emphasize the necessarily substantive quality of the Supreme Court’s 
nominally procedural standing decisions.4 Fletcher demonstrated that any 
standing decision can be recast as a substantive holding, and he recognized 
the metaphysical quality of denying a claimant standing for want of injury. 
Fletcher established that the Supreme Court’s requirement of an injury in 
fact is invariably satisfied, save in the trivial case of the hypothetical lying 
plaintiff.5 These insights helped support Fletcher’s overriding thesis: 
Standing decisions should rest on whether the underlying source of law—
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory—provides the basis for plaintiff’s 
legal claim.6 
As a corollary, and responding to Antonin Scalia’s Suffolk Law Review 
article,7 the prelude to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,8 Fletcher maintained 
that Congress should have broad discretion to confer standing as a means 
of enforcing federal statutory claims, at least provided that the underlying 
 
1. For a theoretical recasting of this test, see infra note 37 and accompanying text (defining 
Condorcet criterion as the dominant outcome in unlimited binary comparisons absent a first-choice 
majority candidate). 
2. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988). 
3. Mark Twain, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 241 (The American Publishing Co. 1897) (defining a 
“Classic” as “[a] book which people praise and don’t read.”) (emphasis omitted). 
4. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 229 (“The essence of a true standing question is the following: Does 
the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty? This question should be 
seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional 
provision whose protection is invoked.”). 
5. Id. at 231 (“If we put to one side people who lie about their states of mind, we should concede 
that anyone who claims to be injured is, in fact, injured if she can prove the allegations in her 
complaint.”). 
6. Id. (“There is nothing wrong with a legal system imposing such external standards of injury; 
indeed, that is what a legal system must do when it decides which causes of action to recognize as valid 
legal claims. However, in employing such standards, we measure something that is ascertainable only 
by reference to a normative structure.”) 
7. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
8. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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statute is itself constitutional.9 Then-Judge Scalia, sitting on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, had suggested 
recasting the separation-of-powers foundations of standing to limit broad 
congressional conferrals of private attorney general status. Scalia posited 
that such expansions of standing risk an over-judicialization of the 
lawmaking process at the expense of the executive branch.10 By contrast, 
Fletcher’s analysis implies that because Congress has the power to create 
the substantive source of law within its purview, so too it has the power to 
determine the methods by which that law should be enforced.11 At least 
implicitly, in Fletcher’s account, the separation-of-powers underpinnings of 
standing doctrine protect legislative policymaking, including Congress’s 
decisions about methods of enforcing federal claims, whereas in Scalia’s 
account, the separation-of-powers underpinnings of standing protect 
executive enforcement discretion.12 Although Lujan itself was decided after 
Fletcher’s article was published, a reasonable implication of Fletcher’s 
analysis would permit the broad statutory conferral of standing that Scalia, 
writing for the Lujan majority, found constitutionally impermissible.13 
Several scholars at this conference, which celebrates the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of Fletcher’s article, have built upon these foundations. And 
although my intuition is that those in attendance would likewise place 
Fletcher’s article on the top reading list for standing doctrine, there remains 
notable disagreement within our ranks concerning the doctrine’s normative 
foundations. In full candor, although Fletcher’s analysis is important to the 
analysis that follows, I will resist claiming that his study of standing 
somehow corroborates my thesis. My own best reading suggests that 
Fletcher’s prescient article offers some support for each side in the 
 
9. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 253: 
 When Congress passes a statute conferring a legal right on a plaintiff to enforce a 
statutorily created duty, the Court should not require that the plaintiff show “injury in fact” 
over and above the violation of the statutorily conferred right. The Court has often stated 
that the power of Congress to grant standing is limited by the Article III requirement that a 
plaintiff suffer “injury in fact.” But when the Court has decided actual cases involving 
statutory rights, it has never required any showing of injury beyond that set out in the statute 
itself. 
Id. 
10. Scalia, supra note 7, at 896 (“Where the courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do 
enforce upon the executive branch adherence to legislative policies that the political process itself 
would not enforce, they are likely . . . to be enforcing the political prejudices of their own class.”). 
11. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 264 (“In the end, statutory standing cases need not be conceptually 
difficult. If a suit is founded directly on a statute, one looks to that statute to determine whether the 
would-be plaintiff has standing.”) 
12. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (1992). 
13. In his keynote address at this conference, Judge Fletcher sought to reconcile the Lujan 
holding with his general standing analysis as set out in The Structure of Standing. Although this is not 
the central focus of this Article, my own view is that these two theories of standing rest on 
irreconcilable premises and that the premises underlying The Structure of Standing are more defensible. 
See also infra note 14 and cites therein. 
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following debate, which is to say that ultimately I do not believe that The 
Structure of Standing resolves what I take as the central normative 
disagreement among several attendees at this conference. This is not a 
criticism; good-faith interpretive disputes often arise following the 
publication of major works, and for that very reason, it is important to 
acknowledge the historical context within which such works were written.14 
The central dispute that I believe continues to pervade the standing 
literature, and that I plan to address in this Article, is whether standing is 
best understood as furthering a “private-rights” or “public-rights” model of 
judicial decisionmaking. 
Those of us who embrace the private-rights model agree with Judge 
Fletcher that standing determinations are substantive. We further contend 
that the different nature of the substantive holdings resulting from standing 
denials, which typically end litigation, versus those arising from standing 
conferrals, which typically allow litigation to continue and thus invite a 
substantive ruling on the merits, holds normative significance for the 
legitimacy and efficacy of the resulting process of constitutional 
lawmaking. In a series of past works, I have supported this intuition, 
borrowing from the toolbox of social choice.15 Social choice analysis is 
helpful in studying the nature and limits of group decisionmaking, 
including that in the Supreme Court. In this Article, I will revisit that 
analysis to defend what I contend are its normative implications for 
standing doctrine. 
In a series of thoughtful works on standing, Professor Robert Pushaw 
has taken a somewhat longer path, thoughtfully constructing a neo-
federalist critique of standing doctrine16 that ultimately has led him to a 
similar place. In his most recent article on standing, published prior to this 
 
14. As previously suggested, that context is largely informed by a separate dispute concerning 
whether the separation-of-powers foundations of standing are primarily designed to protect 
congressional monitoring of executive enforcement discretion or to provide autonomy for executive 
discretion itself. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. Although this dispute remains, and 
indeed, although the Court has itself vacillated on this question, compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 
(1992), it is not the primary focus of this Article. 
15. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS 
OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (paperback ed. 2002); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the 
Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875 (2008); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental Standing, 11 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (2000); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: 
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and 
Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995). 
16. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of 
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional 
Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 
1997 BYU L. REV. 847; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996). 
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conference,17 Pushaw argued that private-rights adjudication improves the 
normative legitimacy of constitutional lawmaking. As a consequence, 
Pushaw claims, federal courts should apply standing doctrine in a manner 
that affirmatively ensures, or at least encourages, fortuity—in the sense of 
factors presumptively beyond the litigants’ control—as the dominant driver 
in the timing of constitutional litigation.18 Although our approaches share 
important common features, there are also notable differences.19 Whereas 
my approach is positive—explaining standing’s doctrinal foundations as 
furthering the private-rights adjudicatory model and then allowing the 
applications to fall as they may without regard to actual litigant 
motivations—Pushaw’s approach, which is grounded in the historical 
meaning of “case” or “controversy,”20 is normative—advocating that the 
federal judiciary construe standing doctrine specifically to promote the 
private-rights adjudicatory model. 
These approaches lead to potentially differing normative implications 
in some cases,21 but the analytical commonality suffices to combine them, 
along with some other notable works on standing, 22 under the broad 
umbrella of a private-rights adjudicatory model. This model rests on an 
important premise: what legitimates judicial lawmaking—meaning the 
announcement of presumptively binding precedent in the course of 
deciding cases—is the fortuity of the timing of judicial decisionmaking on 
any given legal issue. This premise has a long pedigree,23 and, I will argue, 
it also has a strong functional justification. 
 
17. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from 
Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
18. Id. at 11 (“[S]tanding should focus on the appropriate plaintiff who can bring an Article III 
‘Case’—namely, one whose federal legal rights have been violated fortuitously (that is, involuntarily as 
a result of a happenstance event or action beyond the plaintiff’s control) and who can therefore 
legitimately trigger the court’s expository function.”). 
19. For Professor Pushaw’s earlier co-authored critique of the social choice account of standing, 
one still grounded in the neo-federalist analysis, see Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How is 
Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2010) (reviewing STEARNS, supra note 15). 
20. Pushaw, supra note 17, at 3, 11 n.45. 
21. As possible illustrations, consider Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which involved litigants who met the Court’s articulated standing 
criteria but also might have been motivated as much, if not more, by the desire to create precedents 
restricting race-based affirmative action than to secure relief in the form of admission to the University 
of Michigan as an undergraduate and law student, respectively. 
22. Other articles that view standing doctrine within this tradition include Eugene Kontorovich, 
What Standing Is Good for, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2007), and Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of 
Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). 
23. This is perhaps most notable in the often overlooked “duty” component of the famous 
formulation in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. at 177 (emphasis added). The 
implication, made plain in the case itself, is that it is the obligation to resolve the case (the duty) that 
gives rise to the power (or province) to announce, as needed, interpretations of the law as required to 
resolve the case. 
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In a related work, I have recently argued that a private-rights 
adjudicatory model enhances the legitimacy, and thus the durability, of 
precedent.24 That is because if the primary normative justification for using 
a case as the vehicle to establish a sought-after precedent is today’s 
presently favorable judicial staffing, then the argument for respecting that 
precedent erodes when those disfavoring the precedent confront what they 
regard as preferred judicial staffing some time in the future. While it may 
be quaint to observe that what’s good for the goose is good for the gander, 
that doesn’t make the claim less true. Fortuity as a timing principle largely 
avoids this difficulty because the normative justification for respecting 
precedent is then independent of favored or disfavored judicial staffing. 
Rather, the fortuitous circumstances that create the need for judicial 
resolution of the case also justify the resulting precedent. In this Article, I 
will focus on the closely related descriptive claim that standing has become 
a central judicial vehicle that promotes this private-rights adjudicatory 
model. 
In separate works published in the Stanford Law Review and Texas 
Law Review, Professors Heather Elliott and Jonathan Siegel have argued 
that the social choice account of standing, along with other accounts that 
are consistent with the private-rights model, rests on the “great myth” that 
the judicial lawmaking function is inextricably tied to dispute resolution, 
with the creation of precedent as an incidental byproduct.25 Instead, they 
contend, the federal judiciary, including especially the Supreme Court, 
should be understood first and foremost as an institution whose primary 
purpose and responsibility is to announce legal rules, with specific case 
resolutions ultimately a subsidiary concern, or perhaps a mere justificatory 
vehicle allowing this important judicial function to occur.26 
 
24. Maxwell L. Stearns, Private Rights Litigation and the Normative Foundations of Durable 
Constitutional Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (C.J. Peters, ed., 
forthcoming 2013). 
25. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008); Jonathan R. Siegel, 
A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2007). This debate was implicated in the two recently 
decided cases related to same-sex marriage, Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). For a discussion and analysis, see infra Part III.F.  
26. Other notable standing scholars have expressed similar views. For example, in critiquing 
doctrine, Professor Steven Winter has said: 
 The stripped-down definition of “case or controversy” that I have just described is only 
the common denominator of the political question and standing doctrines. It would account 
for virtually all of the classic decisions in cases mounting generalized challenges to 
constitutional amendments or congressional statutes. If the definition doesn’t say very much, 
it is because there isn’t much to say. Once we recognize that legislation and adjudication are 
not dichotomous, but are merely different points on a single normative spectrum, then we 
are free to assume responsibility. 
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1512 (1988) (footnote omitted). The works of Siegel and Elliott are particularly notable here 
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Throughout this Article, I will refer to this view of standing as resting 
on the “public-rights” model of adjudicatory decisionmaking. In this 
model, standing doctrine, at worst, disrupts the federal judiciary’s central 
lawmaking function, and at best, constitutes an ineffective yet troublesome 
barrier to such lawmaking efforts. As Siegel explains, if the function of 
standing is to deter litigant efforts to optimize case timing as a means of 
influencing substantive doctrine, it is roughly akin to throwing a “few 
grains of sand” into the gears of the judicial lawmaking apparatus.27 
This Article will respond to these claims with three main points. First, 
it will show that this argument creates an internal tension to the extent that 
minor inconveniences—of the grains-of-sand variety—are unlikely to 
systematically thwart whatever lawmaking function the federal judiciary is 
empowered to undertake. Thus, if there are notable benefits to standing 
doctrine, as I contend there are, these small costs are likely insufficient to 
overcome them. Conversely, if the interference is great, then the grains-of-
sand metaphor proves inapt. Standing doctrine is then doing real work in 
affecting the timing of the judicial lawmaking function. We might or might 
not much like standing doctrine’s timing consequences, but that merely 
demonstrates that standing doctrine is nontrivial. At that point, the question 
becomes which normative account of standing doctrine is more 
compelling—an inquiry that returns us to the issue of the public-versus 
private-rights model of adjudicatory decisionmaking. 
Second, the Article will evaluate the trade-offs in the value, and 
specifically the durability, of precedent as between these two models. The 
analysis reveals that the fortuitous timing associated with a private-rights 
model makes case law development less predictable yet more durable, 
whereas the non-fortuitous timing associated with a public-interest model 
makes development of case law more predictable yet less durable.28 As is 
generally the case with positive models, the analysis thus far does no more 
than expose the inevitability of this trade-off; the ultimate decision as to 
which of these options is superior rests on premises that the model itself 
can neither prove nor disprove. My own normative view is that the former 
regime is not only more attractive, but also more legitimate. Even if public-
rights standing scholars reject that position, as I believe they must, they 
should at least recognize the inevitability of the trade-off and, thus, the cost 
of their preferred alternative, the public-rights model. 
 
inasmuch as they have articulated similar views in direct response to the social choice model of 
standing. See infra Part II. 
27. Siegel, supra note 25, at 75 (“They [standing and related justiciability doctrines] throw a few 
grains of sand into the workings of the judicial branch but do not prevent it from grinding out a 
judgment.”). 
28. Stearns, supra note 24. 
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Finally, the Article will demonstrate that these critiques rest on a 
misreading of the social choice model of standing. Specifically, the 
critiques mistakenly imply that relaxing the model’s limiting conditions 
undermines the claim that with reasonable assumptions—even with no 
changes in Supreme Court staffing, the disposition of cases below, 
intervening precedent, or the jurisprudential views of sitting Justices—
standing and other timing-based justiciability barriers limit the power of 
ideological litigants to effect substantive doctrine through favorable case 
orderings. The opposite is true: Relaxing these limiting conditions has the 
potential to enhance, not diminish, incentives to manipulate case orderings 
for maximal doctrinal effect. Thus, expanding the social choice analysis to 
account for (1) delays in lower federal courts or state courts, (2) the results 
of changed judicial staffing on the Supreme Court, and (3) the bidirectional 
nature of constitutional and prudential standing rules more likely generates 
a “butterfly effect,” with substantial, and generally unforeseeable, 
implications for developing doctrine, rather than an inconsequential tossing 
of sand into the works of developing precedent. Individually or in 
combination, these factors show standing doctrine’s considerable 
importance and effectiveness in infusing fortuity as the driver in 
sequencing doctrinally significant constitutional claims. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the social choice 
analysis of standing and relates it to the debate over the public-versus 
private-rights adjudicatory models. Part II presents the major criticisms that 
Professors Siegel and Elliott level against the social choice model. Part III 
defends against these criticisms both on methodological and normative 
grounds, thus demonstrating the power of the social choice account of 
standing and the private-rights model on which it rests. 
I. SOCIAL CHOICE, STANDING, AND PRIVATE-VERSUS-PUBLIC-
LAWMAKING MODELS 
In this part, I will provide a brief summary of the social choice account 
of standing doctrine. Because those attending this conference are familiar 
with the standing case law, I will not include a detailed doctrinal survey. 
Instead, I will refer to specific cases as needed to elucidate particular 
analytical points. 
Most commentators claim that standing doctrine is incoherent, 
politically or ideologically driven, ineffective, or some combination.29 The 
social choice account of standing was, in the first instance, motivated by 
my desire to explain the doctrine to constitutional law students so that they 
would have a means of placing the many cases within a coherent analytical 
 
29. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 15, at 1326–27 n.66. 
4 STEARNS 349-401 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2013 4:12 PM 
358 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:2:349 
framework. When I began this project, I primarily anticipated resistance to 
my claim that the social choice analysis of standing was robust, meaning 
that it offered a better means of reconciling this large and heavily criticized 
body of case law than competing theories. To my surprise, I have received 
virtually no criticism of this particular claim.30 Instead, I have received 
pushback on normative grounds primarily related to the model’s underlying 
assumption of a private-rights adjudicatory model.31 In this Article, I will 
not provide a sufficiently detailed application of the doctrine to separately 
support the claim of robustness. Elsewhere I have made the case that the 
social choice account of standing lines up more cases, including the most 
contentious cases, as compared with other doctrinal accounts.32 
I begin with a brief overview of the social choice model of standing, 
and then take up the previously identified critiques. The analysis 
demonstrates that standing doctrine raises the cost to litigants of ordering 
cases favorably to substantively affect developing constitutional doctrine. It 
does so by creating barriers to path manipulation, meaning efforts to place 
decisions in a preferred order of resolution. Path manipulation involves 
timing, meaning relative ordering, of cases for decision in a manner that 
increases the likelihood that those determining the order—called agenda 
setters—will obtain the eventual doctrinal outcome, or outcomes, that they 
prefer. 
A. Sequencing, Dimensionality, and Cycling33 
The basic elements of the social choice account of standing can be 
expressed simply. As a consequence of stare decisis, or the presumptive 
adherence to precedent, holding all else constant, different case orderings 
have the potential under specified conditions to generate different doctrinal 
results. Sophisticated litigators and judges intuitively understand this, and 
they are therefore motivated to present cases in what they anticipate will be 
a preferred sequence. For largely historical reasons that relate to a 
combination of unstable coalitions in the Supreme Court itself and its 
complex relationship with lower federal courts,34 the Court has in recent 
decades constructed defenses against obvious mechanisms through which 
ideological litigants can favorably sequence cases to exert an impact on 
 
30. Indeed, one attendee at this conference once told me that although mine was the most robust 
account of the standing cases of which that scholar was aware, that person would deny it if I so 
identified her or him. Rest assured that your identity remains safe with me! 
31. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 25; Elliott, supra note 25. 
32. See generally supra note 15 and cites therein. 
33. For sources that set out this model in greater detail, see supra note 15 and cites therein. 
34. See Stearns, Standing in the Roberts Court, supra note 15 (presenting data on both the Court’s 
internal coalition stability and its ideological relationship with the federal circuit courts of appeal). 
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developing constitutional doctrine. Most notably, the Supreme Court has 
employed its standing doctrine to accomplish this task.35 Standing doctrine 
helps to accomplish this by presumptively grounding the order of cases in 
fortuitous events as opposed to advertent litigant strategy. While the 
resulting doctrine continues to be affected by the relative ordering of cases, 
or, in the language of social choice, remains path dependent, the doctrine is 
less prone to path manipulation. This means the primary determinants of 
the path are fortuitous historical events generating cases in need of 
resolution, rather than advertent litigant strategy. As a normative matter, I 
argue, this process enhances the legitimacy of constitutional case law. 
The tools of social choice help to unpack this brief summary. While the 
social choice tools do not change the essential features of the preceding 
account, they allow for a more precise methodological exposition about the 
nature and limits of the relationship between case orderings, on the one 
hand, and substantive doctrinal outcomes, on the other. Social choice 
analysis is unfamiliar to many readers and is potentially daunting for the 
uninitiated. Although I will only provide a brief summary, I will do so 
without mathematics, and I will introduce familiar case illustrations where 
appropriate. 
The analysis begins with three individuals, P1, P2, and P3, choosing 
among three options, A, B, and C. Assume that no option has majority 
support as a first choice and that as a result, the participants must select a 
means of decision other than simple majority rule. They decide to each 
rank all options from most to least preferred and then to take a series of 
pairwise comparisons, with each member voting sincerely based on his or 
her expressed preferences until a stable winner emerges. Social choice 
reveals that with particular combinations of individual preferences—P1: 
ABC, P2: BCA, P3: CAB or P3: CBA, P2: BAC, P1: ACB—this voting 
protocol will not succeed in selecting a stable or dominant outcome. 
Instead, the members will discover a “cycle” in which separate majorities 
prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A, for the first listed preferences, or C to B, 
and B to A, but A to C, for the second.36 
The absence of a first-choice majority winner does not always produce 
a cycle. By changing the first set of preferences for P3 from CAB to CBA, 
 
35. To be sure, I do not claim that the Supreme Court justices consciously embrace this rationale 
in their actual standing decisions; rather, as with economic analysis of law more generally, my positive 
thesis is that the standing rules endure inasmuch as they solve a problem that alternative doctrines 
would not solve, even if the conscious motivation for their creation lies elsewhere. 
36. It is possible to impose a rule that cuts off the cycle at some point, and in various institutional 
settings, such rules are commonplace. While the outcomes of decisionmaking in regimes characterized 
by structure-induced equilibriums are stable, they are also arbitrary in the sense that an alternative 
protocol would have justified an alternative outcome in a binary comparison against the chosen 
outcome. For a discussion of structure-induced equilibrium, see Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. 
Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 514 (1981). 
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and following the same decisionmaking protocol, the group will discover 
that B is preferred to both A and C in direct binary comparisons. B is 
known as the Condorcet winner, named for the Marquis de Condorcet, who 
proposed that absent a first-choice majority candidate, the option that 
defeats all others in direct comparisons should be regarded as best.37 
The Condorcet criterion is a helpful decisionmaking benchmark that 
reflects a commitment to majoritarianism, an important democratic norm.38 
When a group decisionmaking process selects a non-Condorcet winner 
even though a Condorcet winner is available, in a very real sense the 
process has thwarted majority rule. Assume for example that the 
decisionmaking rule generated outcome A or C in the prior round. Had the 
decision makers been given the option to take a pairwise vote between the 
prevailing option and the Condorcet winning alternative, B, the latter would 
have prevailed by simple majority rule. 
Based on this intuition, the ability of institutions to ensure that 
available Condorcet winners are selected, known as the Condorcet 
criterion, is often considered a critical normative benchmark of institutional 
quality. And yet, as a result of two notable limitations, some institutions 
have evolved in a manner that thwarts the Condorcet criterion.39 First, as 
shown in the cycling illustration, not all non-majority preference 
configurations include a Condorcet winner. Applying rules that ensure that 
available Condorcet winners prevail when no Condorcet option is present 
will result in a cycle. Introducing a decisionmaking rule that breaks the 
cycle will produce an outcome, but that outcome will be in some sense 
arbitrary as compared with the merits of forgone alternatives.40 Second, 
even when preference configurations include a Condorcet winner, that 
option is not always an optimal social choice. That is because the 
Condorcet criterion considers only ordinal preference rankings, and thus 
does not account for the intensities with which individuals hold their 
preferences. Even though B is a Condorcet winner in the last example, it is 
possible that the issue under consideration is most important to P3, who 
ranks B last, and that P1 and P2, although generally content with any of the 
 
37. Attentive readers might notice that my adaptation of Twain’s test of canonical status, see 
supra note 3 and accompanying text, satisfies the Condorcet criterion inasmuch as we might assume 
that by excluding authors’ own works, it identifies a dominant second choice—that option that defeats 
all others in binary comparisons—in the absence of a first choice candidate, as the test for a canonical 
work on standing. 
38. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 100 (1982) (“[W]hen an alternative 
opposed by a majority wins, quite clearly the votes of some people are not being counted the same as 
other people’s votes.”). 
39. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 46. 
40. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 36. 
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three choices, have only slight preferences reflected in their expressed 
ordinal rankings. 
Another consideration that might justify bypassing an available 
Condorcet winner involves the legitimacy of the decisionmaking rule itself. 
It is possible that although a given array of preferences contains a 
Condorcet winner, that circumstance is not typical for the decisionmaking 
body. It is also possible that the decision makers prefer including the issue 
over which a Condorcet winner exists along with several others even if the 
effect is to thwart the Condorcet winner to allow a broader coalition-based 
agreement over multiple issues.41 If participants have long recognized the 
chosen non-Condorcet regime as legitimate, then the occasional forgone 
Condorcet winner might be an acceptable price for an institution justified 
on other grounds. This is especially likely if the rule is well known in 
advance, thus providing notice as to how interested persons may 
meaningfully participate. 
Appellate courts are among the notable institutions employing rules 
that thwart the Condorcet criterion. Because appellate courts are generally 
obligated to resolve properly docketed cases, employing rules meeting the 
Condorcet criterion would conflict with that obligation when there is no 
Condorcet winner. Elections similarly thwart the Condorcet criterion, a 
result that follows from the combined need to ensure outcomes, on the one 
hand, and the desire to present the winner as a legitimate victor (one who 
would not obviously be defeated by a forgone candidate if contests were set 
up with ongoing binary comparisons), on the other. More generally, when 
institutions have an obligation to ensure outcomes—regardless of whether a 
Condorcet winner is likely to be present—they are going to adopt a rule 
that does not meet the Condorcet criterion. And, as a result, they will miss 
occasional Condorcet winners. 
The Supreme Court applies non-Condorcet rules when deciding both 
individual cases and groups of cases over time.42 In individual cases, 
outcome voting over the binary choice to affirm or reverse the judgment 
below ensures an outcome even though in a small set of non-majority 
cases, it is possible to identify the ingredients of a cycle over the outcome 
(which we can think of as a macro-issue) and controlling issues (or over 
issues and subissues). In groups of cases over time, stare decisis, meaning 
the presumptive obligation to adhere to precedent, breaks cycles by limiting 
the permissible questions that a later court, presumptively bound by 
precedent, may consider in its formal decisionmaking process in resolving 
the case before it. 
 
41. For a general discussion as this relates to plebiscites, see Stearns, supra note 24. 
42. Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice 
Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 (1999); Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 15. 
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Standing doctrine is closely linked to the cycle-breaking function of 
stare decisis. Social choice reveals that a common means of breaking 
cycles and of ensuring an outcome is to limit the number of votes relative 
to the number of options.43 Stare decisis accomplishes this by formally 
preventing decision makers from reconsidering an option that was defeated 
in the past. This decision protocol—no reconsideration of defeated 
alternatives—prevents the final binary comparison, one pitting the 
previously defeated option against the eventual claimed victor, which 
would risk disclosing a cycle. 
Consider once again the following cycling preferences: ABC, BCA, 
CAB. Recall that these preferences imply ApBpCpA where p means 
preferred by simple majority vote in a binary comparison. If the 
decisionmaking rule permits only two votes over the three options, the 
members will select an outcome. Assuming the members vote sincerely, 
then whoever sets the order of votes, referred to as the agenda setter, can 
obtain the outcome she prefers. By setting up as the first vote a choice 
between that option that defeats the agenda setter’s preferred option and 
whichever option would defeat it in a direct comparison, the agenda setter 
will create a voting path leading to her preferred outcome. If, for example, 
the agenda setter wants outcome C, then she need only have an initial vote 
between B, the option that defeats C, and A, the option that defeats B. After 
A defeats B, C defeats A. Even though B would have beaten C, B cannot be 
reconsidered. The same technique would allow the agenda setter to set a 
path producing A or B. 
Not surprisingly, participants can, and sometimes will, try to derail this 
voting path by voting strategically, meaning in a manner that is not based 
on their sincere preferences over options, when faced with a binary choice. 
If in the A versus B vote, P1 fears his last choice, C, will prevail, he might 
vote strategically for B instead of A even though doing so is inconsistent 
with his ordinal ranking. Assuming the remaining votes are sincere, B will 
defeat A (with P1 and P3 prevailing), and in the final vote, B will defeat C 
(with P1 and P2 prevailing). Alternatively two players might join forces by 
trading votes to achieve a preferred outcome, albeit at the expense of the 
excluded party. 
This brief introduction to social choice has revealed not only the 
possibility of cycling preferences and of rules that undermine 
majoritarianism, but also it has introduced other normative considerations 
that inform group decisionmaking. These combined principles include 
majoritarianism, ensuring outcomes, principled voting, agenda 
manipulation, rules permitting (or discouraging) vote trading (also known 
as Pareto exchange). In one of the most famous contributions to social 
 
43. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 15, at 1315 n.11. 
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choice, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow proved that no single institution 
can satisfy a host of concerns that he considered fundamental to fair group 
decisionmaking.44 Although it is unnecessary to survey Arrow’s Theorem 
here, it is worth mentioning what Arrow ultimately proved. Arrow proved 
the impossibility of designing any single institution that satisfies a set of 
normative considerations very closely tied to those just listed. Specifically, 
he proved that no institution can simultaneously satisfy voting 
requirements—defined as range, independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
nondictatorship, and unanimity—while also ensuring transitive outcomes 
without regard to preference structure (meaning not succumbing to 
cycles).45 
A corollary to Arrow’s proof is that any institution that transforms 
group preferences into collective outputs necessarily violates at least one of 
his identified conditions. As mentioned above, institutions that are 
obligated to issue outputs even when preferences risk cycling avoid rules 
that satisfy the Condorcet criterion. Within the framework of Arrow’s 
proof, this means that they relax range. Range permits all participants to 
rank their choices over the three options in any manner they choose and 
requires that the institution generate an outcome in a manner that honors 
those preferences. An implication of range is that if member preferences 
are ABC, BCA, CAB or CBA, BAC, ACB, then group preferences will cycle 
with ApBpCpA for the first set or CpBpApC for the second set. The cycle 
would threaten to undermine the obligation to reach a collective resolution. 
To avoid that problem, institutions with the obligation to ensure outcomes 
impose limits on the available set of member choices. Rules like outcome 
voting and stare decisis serve that function in appellate courts, including in 
the Supreme Court. 
One notable consequence of range-limiting rules is that they invite 
opportunities for agenda manipulation. Because such rules disallow the 
requisite number of pairwise comparisons to reveal a cycle, they generate 
outcomes that are not always socially significant in the sense of being 
preferred to others in binary comparisons. We can illustrate how stare 
decisis grounds outcomes in case orderings with two actual Supreme Court 
cases decided on the same day. 
 
44. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1st ed. 1951); KENNETH 
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
45. For a more detailed introduction of Arrow’s Theorem and of its relationship to the simplified 
presentation above, see STEARNS, supra note 15, at 81–94. 
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B. The Tale of Two Cases:46 Seattle and Crawford 
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,47 and Crawford v. 
Board of Education,48 the Supreme Court faced the question whether two 
state laws with many similar features, a voter referendum in Seattle, 
Washington, and a legislative referendum in California, were permissible 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Despite the 
similarities, separate majorities struck down the Washington initiative yet 
sustained the California referendum.49 Each law sought to reverse a more 
local set of decisions that had ordered busing as a means of integrating 
public schools. In Seattle, this was accomplished at the level of the school 
board, and in Crawford, it was accomplished through a set of California 
state court decisions. In each case, the state amended its constitution to 
disallow busing as a means of integration unless doing so was 
constitutionally required to remedy an equal protection violation. In 
Crawford, where the Court sustained the referendum, the law permitted 
busing only as necessary to remedy a violation of federal equal protection 
requirements, and in Seattle, where the law was struck down, the law 
permitted busing only as necessary to remedy a violation of either federal 
or state equal protection requirements. Arguably, the Seattle initiative, 
which was struck, was more liberal than the Crawford referendum, which 
was sustained, inasmuch as the former provided a broader set of 
permissible bases for busing. Either way, however, these combined cases 
reveal a set of preferences that embed a potential cycle. Although a 
majority favored each result, a crossover majority found the cases 
indistinguishable. 
As a result, we can identify three separate majorities over these two 
cases, only two of which can logically prevail at one time: (1) to strike 
down the Seattle initiative; (2) to sustain the Crawford referendum; and (3) 
to treat the two cases the same way. Given these three overlapping 
majorities, if the Court employs a stare decisis rule and if the justices vote 
consistently with their sincere preferences, both case outcomes will turn on 
the order of case presentation. Thus, if Seattle is presented first—with the 
challenged law struck down—when Crawford is later presented, those 
jurists who think that the two cases are indistinguishable will also vote to 
strike that challenged law down. Conversely, if Crawford is presented 
first—with the challenged law sustained—when Seattle is later presented, 
those jurists who think that the two cases are indistinguishable will also 
 
46. With apologies to Charles Dickens. See CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES (1859). 
47. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
48. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
49. For a more detailed discussion of these cases from a social choice perspective, see STEARNS, 
supra note 15, at 170–77. 
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vote to sustain that challenged law. In fact, the two cases were presented 
simultaneously, and decided on the same day, such that stare decisis did not 
attach from one case to the next. Instead, one law was sustained and the 
other struck down, with the thwarted majority comprising those who 
thought the cases indistinguishable. 
This hypothetical, because it involves two cases decided on the same 
day, provides an extreme illustration of the potential for path dependence 
on developing case law. With no changes in Court personnel, or any other 
changes beside the order in which two cases are presented, the result in 
both cases, and the doctrine they produce, is opposite. There are, of course, 
various responses to this hypothetical, including the possibility that one or 
more Justices who expressed the view that the cases are indistinguishable 
when stare decisis is not in play might treat the cases differently, thus 
voting insincerely, when stare decisis is in play. It is also possible that the 
Court itself could avoid the threat of path dependence by using its certiorari 
power in a manner that lowers the risk of path manipulation.50 
Voting strategically does not eliminate path dependence, but rather, it 
affects how path dependence is channeled. Rather than having the path 
manifest itself in the case orders, the path is reflected in the resulting 
doctrinal changes required to accommodate a desired result within a set of 
doctrines that would not otherwise permit that result.51 In addition, the 
Supreme Court’s power to control its docket is only a partial response to 
the threat of path manipulation. There are certain types of questions that the 
Supreme Court is less able to avoid answering, including most notably 
federal circuit splits. With only docket control, ideologically motivated 
litigants could time splits to raise the cost to the Supreme Court of 
declining certiorari, thus rendering the power of docket control illusory.52 
C. Path Manipulation and Standing 
The primary defense that the Supreme Court has used to limit path 
manipulation is its timing-based justiciability doctrines. These rest along a 
spectrum that includes ripeness, mootness, and standing, and within 
standing, the presumptive barrier against third-party standing, diffuse harm 
standing, and claims seeking to correct allegedly unconstitutional rules that 
distort markets to the claimant’s detriment. While these justiciability 
doctrines can be cast along a timing-based spectrum from early to late—
 
50. As discussed more fully below, it is also possible that there might be intervening personnel 
changes on the Court; that the differential filings in the lower courts might affect the timing (or even the 
possibility of review) in the Supreme Court; or that any number of other considerations might affect the 
ultimate dispositions. See infra Part III. 
51. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 192–94. 
52. Id. at 194–97. 
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ripeness, standing, mootness—a more helpful grouping focuses on the 
susceptibility of the claims targeted by each rule to path manipulation. In 
this view, ripeness and mootness are the most obvious barriers to path 
manipulation. Without them, ideologically motivated litigants could 
reconstruct past facts or hypothesize new ones when seeking resolution of 
important constitutional questions and when facing preferred judicial 
staffing. 
Within standing doctrine, which affects the justiciability of presently 
live claims, as opposed to extinct or premature claims, there are also 
gradations of difficulty in constructing claims for judicial consideration. 
Absent traditional standing rules, it would be relatively easy to identify 
third persons, say in prisons or in other relevant communities of interest, 
who are sitting on their claims, and present those claims in a preferred 
ordering. The presumption against permitting diffuse claims is also fairly 
easy to justify. Returning to William Fletcher’s observation about the lying 
plaintiff,53 anyone can reconfigure what appears to be a third-party claim as 
a first-person claim simply by asserting that he or she cares about the other 
person’s injury; unless the claimant is lying, she has suffered an injury in 
fact. The Supreme Court has made this maneuver more costly by creating a 
presumption against diffuse claims.54 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are cases where despite often-
dubious merits, the Court invariably resolves the underlying legal question. 
Criminal appeals are almost never treated as standing cases, even when it 
appears that they should be, for the simple reason that, in general, those 
presenting such claims are motivated by the desire for relief rather than to 
create law.55 Of course this is not always true, and in fact, the Court has 
engaged in a sort of pretzel logic,56 thus facilitating claims in the criminal 
procedure context that are analytically vacuous insofar as the defendant is 
relying upon a claim that clearly belongs to someone else in a contorted 
effort to secure a form of relief. This is most notable in those rare jury 
cases where the Court has gone so far as to allow a white criminal 
 
53. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 231. 
54. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 269–70. 
55. This might further distinguish Professor Pushaw’s standing thesis from my own inasmuch as I 
have criticized those rare cases in which although the person raising the claim is a convicted criminal, 
the underlying claim actually belongs to someone else. In Pushaw’s analysis, because the circumstances 
for raising the claim are fortuitous, at least in the sense that the motivation is relief, not precedent 
creation, those case results might better justify the Supreme Court’s willingness to confer standing. See 
infra Part III.D. 
56. Apologies to Steely Dan. See STEELY DAN, Pretzel Logic, on PRETZEL LOGIC (ABC Records 
1974). 
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defendant to raise a Batson challenge, meaning a challenge to the 
prosecutor’s decision to strike an African-American juror.57 
D. The Tale of Two Other Cases58: Allen and Bakke 
Between the more intuitive standing cases (third-party and diffuse 
claims) and the cases in which standing is overwhelmingly presumed 
(criminal procedure) rests the most difficult body of standing case law. 
This involves what I have previously referred to as “no right to an 
undistorted market.”59 In these cases, the claimant alleges that there is an 
unconstitutional rule adversely distorting a market in which he or she 
wishes to engage that if struck down might result in more favorable market 
conditions. The two paradigmatic illustrations—illustrations yielding 
opposite results on standing—are Allen v. Wright and Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.60 
These cases are particularly important in illustrating the descriptive 
power of the social choice model of standing and in underscoring the 
importance of fortuity in driving case sequencing. The Allen case involved 
a challenge by parents of African-American children attending public 
schools to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax policy that conferred 
automatic tax-exempt status to schools under the umbrella of already-tax-
exempt organizations.61 The parents claimed that an unspecified number of 
institutions benefitting under this tax scheme had engaged, or were 
engaging, in racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. 
Notably, these parents did not claim that their children had applied to these 
discriminatory schools and were denied admission due to their race; rather, 
they claimed that schools with policies that should have barred them from 
obtaining tax-exempt status nonetheless received it, thus lowering the cost 
of attending such schools. In effect, the parents claimed that the allegedly 
unconstitutional IRS policy—affording tax-exempt status to unworthy 
schools—violated the equal protection rights of their children to attend 
integrated public schools in a manner unencumbered by unconstitutionally 
subsidized white flight. Writing for the Allen majority, Justice O’Connor 
denied standing, and in doing so, she identified a set of four links in the 
causal chain between the claimed injury and the eventual integration of 
 
57. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409–10 (1991) (allowing white criminal defendant to 
raise challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986), for exclusion by state of African-
American jurors); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397 (1998) (allowing white criminal 
defendant to challenge exclusion of African-American as jury foreman). 
58. Second apology to Charles Dickens. See supra note 46. 
59. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 274.  
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
61. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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such schools: (1) the extent of the subsidy, (2) the number of schools 
receiving it, (3) whether denying such schools tax-exempt status would 
affect the schools’ racial policies, and (4) whether any such school policy 
changes would affect parental decisions concerning school choice.62 
Whether framed in terms of injury or causation, this attenuated chain 
proved fatal to claimants’ standing. 
In Bakke, a twice-rejected applicant to the University of California at 
Davis School of Medicine challenged the constitutionality of the medical 
school’s affirmative action program, which set aside sixteen of one-
hundred seats for specified racial minorities of which he was not a 
member.63 The procedural history of Bakke is complex. The California 
Supreme Court analogized the case to a claim under Title VII, and it shifted 
the burden to the Regents to prove it would not have denied Bakke’s 
admission without the challenged program in place, a burden the Regents 
conceded they could not meet, resulting in his admission.64 The analytical 
difficulty, however, is that the reverse is also true: just as the Regents could 
not prove Bakke would be rejected without the program in place, Bakke 
could not prove he would have been admitted without it in place. Even 
without the program, there was no guarantee that Bakke would have been 
among the students admitted.65 
In fact, we can easily replicate the Allen causal-chain analysis to show 
at least the same number of causal links potentially stand between the 
admissions practice alleged to violate equal protection and Bakke’s 
ultimate admission assuming that the policy is struck down: (1) the number 
of medical schools with similar policies; (2) the decision of these schools, 
including Davis, as to how to respond to the ruling, including alternative, 
potentially permissible, race-based preference programs; (3) the impact of 
these changes on other applicants’ decisions to apply to Davis; and (4) the 
combined effect of the changed applicant pool on Bakke’s prospects.66 But 
rather than focus on such an attenuated causal chain, the Bakke Court 
justified standing by claiming that Bakke was injured in his inability to 
compete for all one hundred seats.67 
There is nothing illogical, or necessarily insincere,68 about claiming an 
opportunity-style injury. The problem is that one could just as well recast 
the Allen claim in opportunity/injury terms, thus justifying conferring 
standing there on the logic of Bakke. In Allen, the claimants could say that 
 
62. Id. at 759. 
63. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
64. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (Cal. 1976). 
65. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 & n.14. 
66. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 30–35. 
67. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14, 289. 
68. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 231. 
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they did not seek any particular ratio of majority-to-minority students in 
any given school, just as Bakke did not insist upon admission to Davis. 
Rather, like Bakke, they sought only the opportunity for a desired result—a 
shot at a more integrated racial composition at these schools—
unencumbered by the illegal IRS policy, again, just as Bakke wanted the 
opportunity for a shot at admission unencumbered by the illegal affirmative 
action policy. 
The parallelism of these claims—and hence the ability to phrase Allen 
in Bakke terms or Bakke in Allen terms—is not intended to suggest that the 
cases are beyond distinction. Rather, it is to suggest that the distinction is 
one of degree not kind. Whereas the Allen claimants appeared to be 
pressing a claim with national policy significance that might or might not 
affect their children in a concrete manner and thus appeared primarily 
motivated to effect legal change, Bakke instead appeared a more 
traditional—A hit B, B sued A—litigant. With ripeness and mootness 
occupying one end of the spectrum and criminal procedure occupying the 
other, the market-distortion cases occupy the hard middle. They share a 
common analytical box, but with features pulling Allen more in the 
direction of a presumption favoring efforts at path manipulation and with 
features pulling Bakke more in the direction of a presumption favoring 
efforts to secure relief, in spite of, rather than because of, the resulting 
effect on developing case law. Most notably, this assessment has nothing to 
do with the respective merits of the legal claim or with the degrees to 
which one might find either claim more or less compelling on normative 
grounds. 
For whatever it is worth, my personal view is that the Allen plaintiffs 
are in significant respects more compelling litigants than Bakke. For that 
matter, many claimants who are denied standing are compelling litigants, 
including the Sierra Club, the NAACP legal defense fund, and the ACLU. 
The issue is not the strength of the claim or the zealousness with which the 
litigant will press it; rather it is whether the suit, as presented, possesses the 
characteristic features that the Court has come to associate with efforts to 
win suits even if the result is to make law (consistent with the private-rights 
model), as opposed to efforts to make law even if doing so requires 
devising a suit (consistent with the public-rights model). 
E. Standing Elements and Path Manipulation Revisited 
The social choice model of standing demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional prerequisites to standing—injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability—combined with the presumptive barriers to standing—
presuming against third party and diffuse harm injuries—further the goal of 
making advertent path manipulation more costly and thus more difficult. 
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These combined rules promote fortuity as the dominant driver in 
determining the path of constitutional litigation. In the traditional A hit B, B 
sued A lawsuit, all of these elements are invariably met. So too, they are 
overwhelmingly met in nearly all criminal procedure cases. They are far 
less likely to be met in cases where the case is unripe, is moot, rests on a 
claim belonging to another party, or is diffuse. This characterization can go 
in either direction in the undistorted market cases, thus explaining why the 
seemingly problematic results are not distinguishable in kind, but are in 
degree. More generally, these overall conditions are less likely to be met if 
the purpose of the litigation is to create law rather than to provide the 
claimant relief. 
And yet, as Fletcher rightly observes, this is not because the claimant in 
such public interest lawsuits has not been injured. If a claimant is upset that 
a potential violation of law has previously occurred, has occurred to 
someone else, or has affected her along with countless others in some way, 
unless she is lying, she is, in fact, injured. But if the purpose of standing is 
to limit advertent path manipulation, the question is not if the claimant 
suffers some metaphysical injury. Rather, it is whether the justification for 
the suit is satisfied, namely as a means of securing relief for the claimants 
as opposed to using, or even constructing, the claim to generate favored 
doctrine. This certainly relates to the protected rights embedded within the 
relevant source of substantive federal law, as Fletcher claims, but also it 
relates to the nature of the underlying litigation and whether the features of 
the suit correlate with traditional features of litigation or with efforts to use 
the courts to secure doctrinal victories. 
II. STANDING ATOP GRAINS OF SAND: OBJECTIONS TO THE SOCIAL CHOICE 
MODEL 
Let us now consider the primary objections that have been leveled 
against this standing model. Because the objections are important to the 
analysis to follow, and to represent the criticisms fairly and on their own 
terms, I quote the critics at some length. Some of the language not only 
targets my social choice account, but also a related standing account by 
Professor Lea Brilmayer. Her analysis also rests on a private-rights model, 
and her primary focus, as explained below, is ensuring that the litigants 
who press the claims are actually harmed by the injuries for which they 
seek redress. This implicates Professor Fletcher’s analysis of injury, but for 
now, we focus on the criticism of these combined private-rights analyses: 
 Professor Brilmayer’s theory . . .  exposes what might be called 
the Great Myth that lies behind the private-rights view of 
justiciability. It is commonplace for courts and scholars to remark 
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that courts do not exist to enforce the laws and the Constitution, 
and to make sure the government behaves lawfully; courts do these 
things but only as a mere incident of their proper function of 
deciding cases. In the mythical world posited by this private-rights 
view of litigation, constitutional adjudication is something that just 
happens sometimes, almost against the will of courts. Plaintiffs are 
fortuitously injured by circumstances beyond their control, they go 
to court seeking simple redress for their injuries, and constitutional 
adjudication occurs only because the courts are sometimes 
compelled to resolve constitutional issues in order to decide the 
resulting cases as they happen to come along. 
 In the real world, however, . . . cases do not just come along. 
Individuals and interest groups create cases for the specific purpose 
of getting courts to resolve legal issues and to compel the 
government to obey the laws. A single plaintiff’s contrived case 
can create law (good or bad) that affects the rights of everyone in 
society. Plaintiffs, even working within a system ostensibly 
confined by the private-rights view, can make courts perform the 
public-rights function of enforcing the Constitution and making the 
other branches of government behave lawfully. 
 So if the purpose of justiciability doctrines is to protect the 
rights of absent, interested parties from the effect of stare decisis, 
they do a poor job. Exposure to bad law created by prior litigants is 
part of the common law system. Even enforced to the hilt, 
justiciability doctrines leave highly interested parties exposed to 
bad law created by strangers who may be only trivially interested, 
or who may be no more than busybodies who deliberately got 
themselves injured for the purposes of litigation. A strict insistence 
on maintaining the myth of the private-rights view, while 
structuring the system so as to permit the public-rights view to 
flourish in fact, serves no useful purpose.69 
While these comments were specifically addressed to Professor 
Brilmayer, Professor Siegel then explained that they apply with equal force 
to the social choice account of standing, summarized above. 
 Professor Maxwell Stearns provides a “social choice” 
explanation for justiciability constraints, particularly standing 
doctrine, that [rests on similar foundations to] the Brilmayer 
“representational” theory. According to Stearns, the critical 
purpose behind standing doctrine is related to the “path 
 
69. Siegel, supra note 25, at 93–94 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
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dependency” of constitutional law—the (alleged) fact that because 
of the principle of stare decisis, the outcomes of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional cases depend on the order in which the cases 
come to the Court. This path dependency, Stearns argues, gives 
ideological litigants an opportunity to manipulate constitutional 
doctrine by controlling the order in which they bring cases. 
Therefore, Stearns concludes, modern standing doctrine is best 
understood as a device that “presumptively prevents ideological 
litigants from strategically timing cases in federal court solely to 
manipulate the substantive evolution of constitutional doctrine.” It 
does so by limiting the ability of ideological litigants to create 
cases that suit their path-manipulative strategies. 
 Like Professor Brilmayer’s argument, this argument focuses on 
the restraint that standing doctrine imposes on the ability of 
litigants to create law that affects others through the mechanism of 
stare decisis. Unlike Brilmayer, however, who is primarily 
concerned with protecting the ability of the persons “most 
affected” by government policies to represent their own interests, 
Stearns is concerned with protecting the courts themselves from 
ideological litigants who desire to exploit the law’s path 
dependency. 
 Still, to the extent that Stearns’s argument focuses on the stare 
decisis effect of cases brought by ideological litigants, it suffers 
from a defect similar to that of Brilmayer’s argument. It greatly 
overstates the restraint that standing doctrine imposes on the ability 
of ideological litigants to create cases that could be used to exploit 
the law’s path dependency. Stearns asserts that “[t]he principal 
standing ground rules require that claimants be injured by 
fortuitous historical circumstances beyond their control as a pre-
condition to litigating in federal court.” That is certainly not true; 
Stearns is simply restating the Great Myth that courts just decide 
cases as they come along randomly. In reality, standing doctrine, 
even at its most stringent, does not require potential litigants to 
wait for “fortuitous historical circumstances” before suing. 
Ideologically interested parties are permitted to place themselves in 
harm’s way in order to suffer an injury that can serve as the basis 
for standing. As a result, ideological litigants have considerable, if 
not unlimited, freedom to create justiciable cases that they can use 
to pursue their alleged schemes of path manipulation, and interest 
groups exploit this freedom by seeking out ideal plaintiffs for test 
cases. Once again, therefore, it seems that standing doctrine does 
such a poor job of serving the asserted purpose that the purpose 
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cannot justify regarding the doctrine as a constitutional 
requirement.70 
In a footnote to this paragraph, Siegel analogizes the social choice 
account to throwing grains of sand into the gears of judicial lawmaking. He 
explains: 
Like a good economist, Stearns falls back on the assertion that 
standing rules can sufficiently have their desired effect even if they 
do not prevent ideological path manipulation, provided they make 
it more costly. But there is a vast difference between saying that 
standing rules limit litigation to those who are injured 
“fortuitous[ly],” and saying that standing rules allow ideological 
litigants to manipulate the judicial process but throw a little sand in 
the gears when they do so. It seems much harder to believe that the 
latter is really a constitutional purpose.71 
To further demonstrate the inefficacy of standing to meet the goals set 
out in the social choice account, Siegel explains: 
 Even where there is a justiciability issue in a controversial case, 
it often seems like a mere detail that is unrelated to the reason the 
case is controversial. Roe v. Wade—the case most prominently 
associated with charges of judicial activism—was arguably moot 
when the Supreme Court decided it, and in Griswold v. 
Connecticut there was a question as to the standing of those 
charged with distributing contraceptives to rely on the rights of the 
third parties to whom they distributed them. But critics of these 
cases are not furious about the Court’s assertion of power in 
inappropriate procedural circumstances; they are furious about the 
substantive outcomes of the cases. If the Court had dismissed these 
cases, in all likelihood it could have found other, unquestionably 
justiciable cases raising the same issues and reached the same 
results. Indeed, just four years prior to Griswold, the Court used 
justiciability grounds to dismiss a challenge (Poe v. Ullman) to the 
same statute brought by the same activists. It is hard to see what 
was gained—in terms of limiting judicial power—by forcing those 
whose test case was dismissed to contrive another test case 
presenting the same challenge but with all the i’s dotted and t’s 
crossed. In the end, the same judges, at the urging of the same 
activists, struck down the same statute that was challenged in the 
 
70. Id. at 113–16 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
71. Id. at 115 n.246 (internal citations omitted). 
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first case. It is hard to see why judicial invalidation of the 
Connecticut statute in Poe would have been a dangerous affront to 
the separation of powers, whereas the same action taken in the only 
slightly different case of Griswold was not.72 
Siegel continues: 
 Furthermore, even where justiciability allows a court to avoid an 
issue because it is not pressed in a proper “case,” the issue can 
recur and sometimes does so quite soon. The Court’s questionable 
standing ruling in Warth v. Seldin allowed it to sidestep the 
constitutionality of zoning restrictions, but the issue came back just 
two years later in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp. The Court ducked the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions in 
DeFunis but reached the issue four years later in Bakke. It was 
admittedly convenient that the Supreme Court avoided ruling on 
the Pledge of Allegiance in Newdow, but that hardly ends the 
matter. Other plaintiffs, with properly justiciable cases, have 
challenged the Pledge of Allegiance on the same grounds, and 
Newdow, after his defeat, did exactly what one would expect: he 
found like-minded parents and children in the California school 
system and enlisted them as plaintiffs in a new, justiciable lawsuit. 
Thus, the courts will have to rule on the merits of the Pledge 
question.73 
Siegel concludes: 
The analysis . . . shows two fundamental problems with 
justiciability doctrines: first, they often accomplish little or nothing 
other than to make judicial review needlessly cumbersome, and 
second, even where they appear to do something, the restraints that 
they impose are not well aligned with any purpose that they are 
said to serve. Courts could improve justiciability doctrines by 
focusing on their purposes. Where justiciability constraints are 
 
72. Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted). In fact, constitutional challenges to the Connecticut statute 
persisted far longer than four years. An original challenge was dismissed for want of standing grounds 
twenty-two years before Griswold, in Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Moreover, the 
participating justices on the Supreme Court did change even between the shorter four-year period from 
Poe to Griswold, and those changes had a perceptible impact on the eventual case outcome. See infra 
note 81, and accompanying text. 
73. Siegel, supra note 25, at 110 (footnotes omitted). 
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purposeless, they should be discarded. Where they serve a purpose, 
there is at least the possibility that they should be retained.74 
In a related discussion, Professor Heather Elliott offers a similar 
critique of the social choice model of standing. Elliott explains: 
[The] Court’s standing jurisprudence reinforces this distorted 
pursuit of democratic goals by making it easiest for economic 
entities to get standing. Such interests are usually suing as 
regulated entities, opposing the exercise of government regulation. 
The Court has emphasized that the standing of a regulated entity is 
typically self-evident: when “the plaintiff is himself an object of 
the action (or forgone action) at issue . . . there is ordinarily little 
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that 
a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” But 
such entities are often the least deserving of democratic solicitude 
from the courts, for they arguably have the most access to the 
corridors of power. The Court has repeatedly applied this 
asymmetric view of standing—making it easy for regulated entities 
to get standing, and hard for everyone else—and that approach, 
again, actually has the effect of exacerbating existing inequalities 
in the democratic system.75 
In a footnote appended to this passage, Elliott further explains: 
 For this reason, Professor Stearns’s meticulous argument on 
social choice and standing also has troubling 
implications. Professor Stearns notes that, because of stare decisis, 
the development of doctrine at the Supreme Court is at least in part 
dependent on the order in which issues are taken up by the 
Court. Moreover, because of paradoxes inherent in collective 
decisionmaking (technically, the intransitivity in preferences 
known as the Condorcet Paradox), the Court may reach different 
results in sequential cases depending solely on the order in which 
the cases are decided. Interest groups thus have incentives to try to 
affect the sequence in which cases arise at the Court. Standing has 
thus emerged as a means for the Court to limit the ability of interest 
groups to manipulate the timing of cases. Because the tripartite test 
demands that litigants make a factual showing “that is largely 
beyond the litigants’ control,” it limits the ability of litigants to 
control the timing of cases. Thus “standing serves the critical 
 
74. Id. at 122. 
75. Elliott, supra note 25, at 491–92 (footnotes omitted). 
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function of encouraging the order in which cases are presented to 
be based upon fortuity rather than litigant path manipulation.” 
 Of course, as Professor Siegel has discussed, the factual bases of 
standing are more within the litigants’ control than Professor 
Stearns acknowledges. My concern is more with the biases that 
Stearns’s position necessarily embraces: because the courts grant 
standing much more readily to regulated entities, especially when a 
strict version of standing doctrine is applied, those entities benefit 
from stare decisis at the expense of regulatory beneficiaries. As 
discussed above, that result may exacerbate existing inequalities.76 
The preceding arguments against the social choice account of standing 
can be summarized as follows: The social choice account rests on the 
“great myth” that federal courts serve primarily a dispute resolution rather 
than lawmaking function. Given that lawmaking function, any path 
dependence associated with stare decisis to justify standing is only 
pertinent if the rules actually work. The major cases about which 
controversy ensues would, absent standing, result in a two-to-four year 
delay, which seems pointless as a constitutional justification for standing. 
With or without standing, interest groups and individual litigants can put 
themselves in harm’s way or locate others who have done so, to order cases 
favorably, and they regularly do just that. The controversial aspects of 
constitutional litigation primarily involve the substantive outcomes 
obtained, not the procedural nuances of standing. And finally, the fortuity 
principle on which the social choice account of standing rests is 
systematically biased in favor of business interests, rather than individual 
interests, a result that is undemocratically skewed given the relative 
disparity between these groups in terms of access to the corridors of power. 
III. STANDING ON A MORE CONCRETE FOUNDATION77 
In the discussion that follows, I will address each of these objections, 
and in doing so I will demonstrate once more the power of the social choice 
account. I will begin with the arguments that go to the claimed inefficacy 
of standing doctrine. Only by showing its efficacy can I restore the 
doctrine’s normative foundations. The central argument against the stare 
decisis account of standing is that the effect of any delays in case 
resolutions is trivial. 
 
76. Id. at 492 n.156 (internal citations omitted). 
77. Or, to borrow once more from Mark Twain, see supra note 3, “[T]he report of my death was 
an exaggeration.” Frank Marshall White, Mark Twain Amused, N.Y. J., June 2, 1897 (quoting Mark 
Twain). 
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A. Two-to-Four Year Supreme Court Delays Are Non-Trivial 
In the examples that Siegel provides, the delays resulting from standing 
generally lasted between two and four years, with the result that after the 
time had lapsed, the Supreme Court had resolved the underlying issue, and 
had done so in the same manner as sought by the original, standing-denied 
claimants. The delay, however, came with the cost of uncertainty 
respecting how those issues would be resolved. This included uncertainty, 
for example, concerning whether couples have a fundamental right to 
contraceptive access; whether a state-sponsored racial preference in higher 
education violates equal protection; and whether neutral zoning restrictions 
with a disproportionate racial impact violate equal protection. If the 
purpose of standing is to ground cases in fortuitous circumstances, rather 
than advertent-litigant strategy, then delays of two, three, or four years in 
generating a resolution to the same problem later resolved in the Supreme 
Court are arguably a fairly inconsequential means of accomplishing it. 
In fact, however, a delay of two-to-four years in the Supreme Court is 
potentially quite consequential in terms of a potential effect on the 
substantive outcome obtained. The contrary impression arises from an 
erroneous inference drawn from the social choice model. This 
misimpression arises in part from the nature of economic modeling. 
Specifically, as is often the case with such models, the social choice model 
of standing is tightly drawn to demonstrate the minimum set of conditions 
required to produce a given effect. In this case, it reveals the minimum 
conditions for a regime lacking timing-based justiciability doctrines—
mootness, ripeness, and, most notably, standing—to encourage 
ideologically motivated litigants to benefit from preferred case sequencing 
as a means of affecting substantive doctrinal outcomes. Thus, the model 
demonstrates the theoretical possibility that without any changes in the 
composition of the Court, without any changes in precedent beyond those 
affected by reordering the immediate cases under review, and without any 
changes in the actual cases themselves, a simple reordering of two cases—
A followed by B versus B followed by A—can entirely change the 
substantive holdings of both cases. 
The mistake is misconstruing this statement of minimal conditions as 
an empirical claim that no other conditions can influence, or even 
exacerbate, such a doctrinal effect.78 I do not claim, for example, that 
 
78. This is a pervasive interpretive dilemma that confronts those who seek to construe economic 
models especially as applied to law and who are not generally accustomed to the style of such 
modeling. Two important examples come to mind. Many legal scholars have misinterpreted the Coase 
Theorem, which holds that in a world with zero transactions costs and perfect information, resources 
flow to their most highly valued uses without regard to liability rules, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), to imply that in fact we live in a world satisfying those 
4 STEARNS 349-401 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2013 4:12 PM 
378 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:2:349 
nothing but intransitive appellate court preferences have the potential to 
affect litigant incentives to favorably order cases to affect substantive 
doctrine. The hypothetical involving Seattle and Crawford merely 
illustrates how the bare-bones version of the model works, leading to the 
surprising implication that even if there are no other changes, mere changes 
in case orderings can have profound effects. With two cases that are issued 
on the same day, with outcomes in tension, and with overlapping majorities 
whose opinions suggest that the cases should be resolved in the same way, 
case orderings have the potential to affect the substantive holdings in both 
cases. It is most unlikely, in fact, that had these cases arisen one year 
apart—with Seattle followed by Crawford or the reverse—all else would 
have remained constant. The critical point, however, is that introducing 
more realistic elements makes the model more, not less, powerful. 
Assume that nothing else changes but the timing of review in the 
Supreme Court itself. In other words, there is no change as a result in lower 
court delays. Unlike the Crawford–Seattle hypothetical, however, this time 
we will introduce the possibility of intervening personnel changes to the 
Court, meaning that the delayed presentation to the Supreme Court might 
result in having the case reviewed before a different natural Court,79 
meaning a Court that comprises different membership than that which 
would have resolved the case had the original case, for which standing was 
denied, instead been resolved on the merits. 
The likely impact of this possible change is significantly enhanced such 
that delays of two to four years, or even delays of less than one year, could 
have profound doctrinal effects. Consider the possibility of one intervening 
Supreme Court appointment. The most dramatic impact of a single-Justice 
change would arise in a case expected to be close, meaning decided by a 5–
4 margin, a prediction often associated with high profile constitutional 
rulings. In such a case, there is a 5/9 chance that changing a single Justice 
will change the case outcome. If the case would be decided 5–4, then 
 
conditions, and thus we should assume welfare-maximizing resource flows. See Ronald H. Coase, Notes 
on the Problem of Social Cost, in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157, 
170–74 (1988). Instead, Coase was trying to demonstrate the danger of legal rules that have the 
opposite effect of raising transactions costs and of inhibiting the flow of information, two adverse 
conditions that combine to undermine allocative efficiency. See id. Similarly, William Riker’s theory of 
minimum winning coalitions posits that in a world with complete information and in which side 
payments are permitted, the most stable coalitions will approach minimum winning size, meaning 
simple majorities. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962). Here too, 
although commentators mistakenly criticized the theory because observed coalitions, including notably 
in Congress, typically comprised supermajorities, Riker’s thesis was not designed to demonstrate that 
his conditions were met, but rather to provide a basis for studying rules within legislative bodies that 
raise the size of governing coalitions. For a general discussion, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. 
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 72–75 (2009). 
79. Online Code Book: Natural Court, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE (Harold J. Spaeth et al. 
eds.), http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=naturalCourt (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (defining 
“natural court”). 
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replacing one of the four minority Justices with either a like-or different-
minded jurist would at most affect the ruling’s composition from 5–4 to 6–
3, but would not change the outcome. If, instead, a member of the expected 
narrow majority of five is replaced between when the case was prevented 
from going forward due to a timing-based justiciability barrier, and when it 
ultimately proceeded, as Professor Siegel has aptly phrased it, “with all the 
s’s dotted and t’s crossed,”80 then this would flip the outcome to 5–4 
favoring the side originally pressing for Supreme Court review to 5–4 
favoring the other side. This implies that five out of nine possible Supreme 
Court replacements could possibly affect outcomes in a high profile case 
expected to be resolved narrowly. Although the actual voting margins in 
the cited cases varied,81 each case that Professor Siegel has relied upon to 
demonstrate the inefficacy of standing qualifies as high profile. 
 
80. Siegel, supra note 25, at 98. 
81. As previously noted, Siegel’s reliance on Poe and Griswold is at least potentially misplaced, 
and the timeline might better support the account offered here. In 1961, Poe was dismissed for want of 
standing in a decision with a 4–1–4 vote. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Frankfurter wrote 
a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and by Justices Clark and Whitaker; Justice Brennan 
concurred in the judgment; and Justices Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and Black dissented. In the four 
years between Poe and Griswold, Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter, and Justice White 
replaced Justice Whitaker. Justice Douglas wrote for the Griswold majority, joined by Justice Clark, 
and also by Justice Goldberg, who wrote a simple concurrence joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Brennan. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 491 (1965). Justices Harlan and White concurred in the 
judgment. And Justices Stewart and Black dissented. Although it appears that Stewart and Black 
switched positions between the two cases, that is unlikely. More likely the four Poe dissenters were 
split evenly on the merits, with Douglas and Harlan favoring striking the Connecticut statute down and 
Justices Stewart and Black rejecting the constitutional claim. Because Justice Frankfurter expressed no 
view on the merits, it is not possible to ascertain with certainty his views or the views of those who 
joined him. It appears plausible, however, that the replacements of Justices Frankfurter and Whitaker 
with Goldberg and White respectively, both of whom supported the judgment striking down the 
Connecticut law, albeit on different grounds, might have flipped a potential contrary outcome that the 
Poe Court would have reached had it conferred standing and resolved the case on the merits. 
Although the different timelines did not actually generate results from substantially different natural 
Supreme Courts, when assessed according to the median duration of natural Courts, each pairing 
certainly had the potential to do so. Although the start date is not specified in the appellate record, the 
district court decisions that gave rise to the eventual Supreme Court decisions in Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490 (1975), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), 
appear to have been separated by two years, with the district court decision in Warth issued in 1972, 
and the district court decision in Village of Arlington Heights issued in 1974. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The district court decisions in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978), were separated by three years with DeFunis initiating his suit the fall of 1971, 416 U.S. at 314, 
and with Bakke commencing his lawsuit following his rejection from the medical school in 1974. Brief 
for Respondent at 15, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). 
Throughout this entire period, from 1972 through 1978, the Court remained remarkably stable with the 
exception of Justice Stevens, appointed by Republican President Gerald Ford in 1974, replacing Justice 
Douglas, appointed by Democratic President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1937. Despite this, most 
constitutional commentators would place Justice Stevens, like Justice Douglas, on the liberal side of the 
Court for most of his career. And also despite this relative continuity, based on probabilities, this same 
time period would have predictably produced three replacements, and using the harmonic mean, 
upwards of seven natural Courts. 
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Now consider historically how often such replacements take place. 
Since 1790, or over a span of 222 years, there have been 117 Supreme 
Court Justices. There is considerable variance in the number of 
appointments in a given historical period,82 with President George 
Washington appointing an entire Court and President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt appointing nine justices over eight seats, with one seat filled 
twice and one seat (filled by Owen Roberts) surviving his administration. 
Conversely, President Jimmy Carter had no appointments in his single-term 
presidency. Setting aside the variance, there has been an average of one 
appointment every 1.89 years. This simple statistic suggests that on 
average, a delay of two years has historically produced a 55% chance of 
replacing a member of a 5–4 majority coalition, although obviously not all 
such replacements will change the ideological direction of the Court. 
There are different methods of calculating frequency of changes on the 
Supreme Court. One useful measure is the harmonic mean, which is the 
mean after removing the extremes at either end. The harmonic mean for 
natural Supreme Courts is a mere nine months,83 implying that delays of 
one to two years are at least potentially more significant than Siegel’s 
thesis suggests. It is important to acknowledge that there is considerable 
variance around that mean. The shortest natural Court arose in the Warren 
Court in 1969 for a period of a single month, and the longest natural Court, 
during the Rehnquist period, lasted 133 months from 1994 through 2005.84 
Indeed, that relatively recent period of natural Court stability might lead 
some observers to imagine that relatively modest delays in timing have a 
lesser consequence in affecting high profile constitutional litigation than is 
suggested by the broader implications of the Court’s appointments history. 
The fact that appointments sometimes occur in waves rather than in 
smooth periods of successive increments makes the effects of such 
appointments less predicable, but it does not change the fundamental 
analysis. Major shifts on the Court, as seen for example from the 
conservative Court at the start of the Progressive era to the New Deal 
Court, from the New Deal Court to the Warren Court, and from the Warren 
Court to the Burger/Rehnquist/Roberts Courts have generated fundamental 
shifts in once-accepted jurisprudential framings. Whereas, for example, 
New Deal liberalism tended to equate to progressivism, and a 
corresponding desire to avoid judicial interference in state or federal 
regulatory policies, Warren Court liberalism relied instead on a far more 
 
82. Supreme Court Nominations, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE STATS. & LISTS, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/reverseNominations.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 
2013). 
83. See infra Appendix A. 
84. Appendix A has tables presenting the number of months of each natural Court from 1946 
through 2010. 
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active level of judicial involvement in advancing a rights-driven agenda, 
even though doing so intruded upon once-protected legislative 
prerogatives. In the modern era, there has been a substantial debate over the 
meaning of conservatism, with some taking the view that judicial restraint 
is more important than particular outcomes, and others taking the view that 
it is important to counterbalance a once-liberal, rights-driven jurisprudence 
with a conservative equivalent, one for example, that emphasizes property 
rights and the Second Amendment.85 
The possibility of intervening Supreme Court appointments and their 
effect on doctrinal direction thus arises in two distinct ways. In its more 
modest form, it risks flipping a particular case outcome, when for example, 
a single appointment changes the Court’s view on a specific doctrinal issue. 
The replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito, for example, 
might have affected holdings in such cases as Gonzales v. Carhart,86 which 
sustained a federal ban on partial birth abortion that did not include 
protection for the health of the mother; Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,87 which by treating corporations as protected persons for 
purposes of the First Amendment, condoned a regime of unlimited 
corporate political contributions; and Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin,88 which curtailed judicial deference to state university rationales 
supporting race-based preferences for diversity as compared with the 
Gratz–Grutter regime. In its stronger form, it risks recasting once-accepted 
framings of constitutional jurisprudence, thus inviting even stronger 
incentives for interest-group efforts to forge desired paths of case law either 
to lock in changes, thus making future incremental changes more difficult, 
or to capture change quickly after a favorable jurisprudential shift. When 
this occurs, the effects of path dependence correspondingly have the 
potential to affect, or cut into, doctrine more deeply. Certainly this was the 
case in the period post “switch in time,” where Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
made a total of nine appointments over eight seats, with only Justice Owen 
Roberts—the one who is alleged to have switched votes—remaining 
throughout FDR’s entire tenure as president. The result was a fundamental 
change in once-dominant understandings across vast fields, including due 
process, non-delegation, the contracts clause, and even justiciability itself. 
 
85. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 17, 2005, at 42. 
86. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
87. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
88. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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B. The Lower Court “Butterfly Effect”89 
Although intervening changes in the Supreme Court can have profound 
effects in shaping doctrine, in some respects timing delays are likely to be 
all the more pronounced in lower federal and state courts. For expositional 
reasons, the social choice analysis of standing is modeled on institutional 
practices in the Supreme Court. The benefit of this approach was that it 
demonstrated an effect through case orderings even when nothing changes 
elsewhere in the system. When we introduce the possibility of such 
changes in state courts and lower federal courts, however, the effect on 
Supreme Court doctrine becomes all the more pronounced. 
Within federal practice, judicial assignments in the district court and 
for appellate panels are typically random.90 A one-or two-year delay, or 
even a one-or two-month delay, will often produce a different district court 
judge assignment, and through luck of the draw the differential timing of 
the ultimate case resolution. This, of course, will also affect the panel to 
which the case is assigned, assuming it is in fact appealed.91 The appeals 
 
89. The term “butterfly effect” has been ascribed to Edward N. Lorenz, who used it to describe 
how present conditions are sensitive to seemingly inconsequential changes in the past. Edward N. 
Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130–41 (1963). The general concept 
had previously gained popular currency as a result of the famous science fiction story, Raymond 
Bradbury, A Sound of Thunder, published in Colliers magazine in 1952, which imagined time travelers 
visiting the age of dinosaurs seeking to avoid altering history, but profoundly changing it when one 
traveler accidentally stomped on a butterfly prior to returning. Lorenz coined the term “butterfly effect” 
in a speech. See Edward N. Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set 
Off a Tornado in Texas?, at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 29 1972), 
available at http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf. 
90. Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Judges, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
91. Consider the example of federal district courts within the Fourth Circuit. From 2009–2010, 
the average time from filing to a civil trial in the Eastern District of Virginia was approximately eleven 
months. See Federal Court Management Statistics Archive, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/FederalCourtManagementStatisti
cs_Archive.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). By contrast, the average time from filing to a civil trial in 
the Eastern District of North Carolina was thirty-two months in 2009 and fifty months in 2010. Id. 
During that two-year period, the composition of the Fourth Circuit itself substantially changed. At the 
beginning of 2009, eleven judges comprised the Fourth Circuit, with seven nominated by Republican 
presidents and four nominated by Democratic presidents. Over the next two years, one Republican-
nominated judge left the bench. Because of additional vacancies on the Fourth Circuit, President Obama 
filled four seats. And since 2010, Obama has filled two more seats. Now reconsider our two 
hypothetical litigants filing at the same time in 2009, one in the Eastern District of Virginia and the 
other in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Whereas the Virginia litigant would likely face a panel 
drawn from the same natural circuit court as when she initially filed, the North Carolina litigant would 
face a panel drawn from an enlarged Fourth Circuit, one that began with eleven judges, and that was 
dominated by Republican appointees, to one that instead had fifteen judges, and that was dominated by 
Democratic appointees. This not only had the potential to alter the composition of a randomly drawn 
panel of three but also it has the potential to affect the disposition of any potential en banc review. And 
in the interim, the composition of the Supreme Court also changed as a result of the replacements of 
Justice Souter with Justice Sotomayor and Justice Stevens with Justice Kagan, although these 
appointments did not affect the overall ideological direction of the Court. 
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court assignment process is particularly notable. Whereas the Supreme 
Court generally hears all docketed cases en banc, meaning that the entire 
Court hears all cases in full, federal circuits review cases in randomly 
drawn panels of three. En banc review in the circuit courts of appeal is not 
only relatively uncommon, but also it is a separate proceeding, and one that 
entirely negates the precedential impact of the original panel decision. It is 
also notable that although most circuit courts have full en banc procedures, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employs a mini en 
banc procedure, drawing a subset of the larger en banc court. This further 
randomizes outcomes even at this separate stage.92 
In a closely divided federal circuit court, there is an increasing 
likelihood that a majority of the assigned three-judge panel could be either 
liberal or conservative, as compared with a clearly dominated court for 
which three-judge panels are likely to mirror the circuit court’s overall 
composition. This introduces another randomizing factor in divided courts 
respecting the disposition of close questions of constitutional doctrine. 
Depending on the luck of the draw and its effect on the case resolution, 
some cases initially intended for eventual Supreme Court resolution might 
be resolved in a manner that renders them no longer suitable for an appeal 
to the Supreme Court, thus further enhancing the delayed timing to get to 
that Court. As one example, if the result is consistent with prior circuit case 
law, it will not produce the desired circuit split designed to make the grant 
of certiorari more likely. Alternatively, the panel might view the issue more 
narrowly, remand for clarification on some arcane issue or a question of 
fact, or decide it on grounds separate from those for which the parties seek 
resolution. And this list is certainly not exhaustive. 
Although Professor Siegel claims that the randomization effect of 
delays is overstated,93 the opposite is more likely the case. As a result of the 
unpredictable effects on (1) district court judge assignments; (2) differential 
timing across and even within particular districts; (3) randomly drawn 
appellate court panels; and (4) the possibility of en banc or mini en banc 
review, a dismissal for want of standing in one case might have enormous 
consequences for the substantive outcome and timing of that outcome in a 
later case in which standing is eventually granted. Rather than proving no 
more consequential than a few grains of sand tossed into the adjudicatory 
gears, the delays are more likely to generate a butterfly effect in which the 
 
92. Maxwell L. Stearns, Appellate Courts Inside and Out, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1764, 1780–85 
(2003) (reviewing JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT 
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002)). 
93. Siegel, supra note 25, 114–16. 
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eventual impact, although never knowable with certainty, might well be 
profound.94 
Part of the analytical difficulty is captured in the adage: “absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence.”95 The intuition is that merely because 
we cannot with certainty identify a direct chain of causation in a given case 
demonstrating that a delay in case 1, resulting from a standing denial, 
produced a different holding in case 2, an otherwise identical case in which 
standing was conferred, does not mean that standing has no consequence or 
that its consequences were trivial.96 The butterfly effect does not imply that 
we can locate stomped-on butterflies or particular wing flaps at key 
moments that produce identifiable causal chains to major current events.97 
On the contrary, the intuition is that we can never do this, but that this 
inability does not undermine claims that past randomizing forces have 
profoundly influenced current events. Going back in time for any major 
case, and changing the start date by even a few months, can result in any 
number of unexpected procedural pathways, delay tactics, or random 
factors affecting timing that result in a very different case trajectory 
respecting a case that as a consequence of any of these factors might or 
might not end up in the anticipated natural Supreme Court if it winds up in 
that Court at all. 
Although it is not possible to identify the effect on a single case with 
precision, it is possible to identify those factors likely to produce such 
effects. The relationship between lower federal court delays and Supreme 
Court delays is likely, for example, to enhance path dependence effects. 
Assume a filing delay resulting from the failure at the preferred time 
 
94. Others have explored the implications of the butterfly effect on constitutional litigation. See 
notably Symposium, The Sound of Legal Thunder, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 483 (1999); Peter Dizikes, 
The Meaning of the Butterfly: Why Pop Culture Loves the ‘Butterfly Effect,’ and Gets it Totally Wrong, 
BOSTON GLOBE, (June 8, 2008), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/ 
articles/2008/06/08/the_meaning_of_the_butterfly/?page=full (“Such borrowings of Lorenz’s idea 
might seem authoritative to unsuspecting viewers, but they share one major problem: They get his 
insight precisely backwards. The larger meaning of the butterfly effect is not that we can readily track 
such connections, but that we can’t. To claim a butterfly’s wings can cause a storm, after all, is to raise 
the question: How can we definitively say what caused any storm, if it could be something as slight as a 
butterfly?”). One of the difficulties with Siegel’s criticism of the social choice account is that it assumes 
that the inability to identify the delay effect in a precisely identified case or set of cases undermines the 
randomization consequences of any number of factors that include standing. This, however, falls victim 
to the analytical difficulty that Dizikes correctly identifies respecting the butterfly effect. 
95. CARL SAGAN, The Fine Art of Baloney Detection, in THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD 201, 213 
(1996). 
96. One additional irony: those scholars who are most critical of O’Connor’s causation analysis in 
Allen, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, on the ground that O’Connor was unwilling to 
acknowledge that striking the challenged IRS practice would have benign effects on public schools 
because those effects could not be precisely foreseen, are committing the same analytical fallacy 
respecting standing inasmuch as they are unwilling to acknowledge that eliminating standing doctrine 
will have profound effects on developing case law because those effects cannot be precisely foreseen. 
97. See Dizikes, supra note 94 (describing misreading of the butterfly effect). 
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period, T1, to meet expected standing requirements to a later, and less 
preferred time period six months later, T2. Assigning the case to a speedier 
judge (one perhaps on a so-called rocket docket) might result in a faster 
resolution by a year or more as compared with a judge who tracks at an 
ordinary or even a slow pace.98 Even a smaller difference in timing can, of 
course, affect such matters as how the district court responds to any number 
of issues related to discovery, motions to dismiss or other pretrial motions, 
jury selection, how the jury resolves the case, and how the district court 
responds to any post-verdict motions. 
One notable issue for petitioning for certiorari is, of course, the 
ultimate disposition below. If a lower court rules favorably on behalf of a 
constitutional claimant, then the government might choose to decide to live 
with the lower court’s adverse ruling, rather than to risk having the case 
become a nationwide ruling. The prospect of petitioning for certiorari is 
enhanced, of course, if the claimant loses, but this difference in outcome, if 
not entirely random in the lower courts—litigants are well aware of the 
overall composition of the various circuits—certainly is not altogether 
predictable either.99 And of course, these delays, or different case 
outcomes, will also affect the nature of the issues appealed, the timing of 
those appeals, and the panel to which that appeal is assigned. Any one 
change along the way can affect whether the case ends up appropriately 
situated for Supreme Court review and the timing of the case in that Court, 
if it does get there. 
Siegel’s two-to-four-year delay critique assumes that nothing else 
changes but the amount of time passed. In the rough-and-tumble world of 
constitutional litigation, however, even seemingly modest timing delays 
can quite literally change just about everything. The social choice model 
shows that even if nothing else changes, the prospect of path dependence—
in the tightly drawn sense—remains a sufficiently significant concern. But 
 
98. Not only are there timing differences among districts, see supra note 91, but also there are 
notable timing differences among judges within the same district. Consider, for example, the most 
recent report provided by the ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 
1990 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/cjra/2012–
03/CJRAMarch2012.pdf. The report provides data, broken down by judge, which include how many 
civil cases have remained pending for more than three years and how many motions have been pending 
longer than six months. Judge Leonard Stark of the District of Delaware had eighty-one civil cases and 
forty-nine motions pending in 2012. Judge Sue Robinson, in the same district and for the same period, 
had only seven civil cases and fourteen motions pending. The judges’ chambers provide various reasons 
for why these cases are unresolved, most commonly multidistrict litigation or complexity of the case. 
And while these results by no means imply that Judge Stark is consistently slower than Judge Robinson, 
it does mean the litigant whose case is assigned to Judge Stark is likely to find herself at the back of a 
long line as compared to the litigant whose case is assigned to Judge Robinson. These timing delays 
then feed into potential effects on changes in the Fourth Circuit, including the random panel draw, and 
then for both the prospect of Supreme Court review and any substantive resolution in the event that 
review is taken. 
99. See the earlier comment on relatively random draw of three-judge panels at supra pg. 134. 
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the model should not be read to make an empirical claim that nothing else 
actually does change,100 or that if such changes occur elsewhere within the 
adjudicatory system, those changes have no randomizing effect. Rather, 
because everything else does change with even modest delays, the effect of 
fortuity becomes all the more pronounced. 
C. The Problem of Legal Counterfactuals 
As is generally true with models used to describe actual historical 
events, it is not possible to test the theory in a lab. There is no method of 
employing a control group of litigants to see how their incentives, and the 
developing course of doctrine, might be affected with and without existing 
standing doctrine. In short, there is no direct evidence one can point to that 
will demonstrate how relaxing standing would produce a particular delayed 
case sequence and how that, in turn, would affect an alternative doctrinal 
path. Once again, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. This 
merely implies a need to devise a more suitable means of testing. 
The primary test that I previously offered to defend the social choice 
model is its robustness in explaining the heavily criticized body of case 
law. As previously noted,101 no one has challenged that claim, and 
interested readers can review earlier works that broadly fit the standing 
case law against this theory and judge for themselves. There is notable 
anecdotal evidence that sophisticated litigants perceive that relative timing 
matters greatly to the development of legal doctrine. And this remains so 
even if litigants are sometimes prone to getting it wrong. 
Consider, for example, that litigants are often encouraged, and 
sometimes discouraged, to litigate cases that might get to the Supreme 
Court. In two famous recent illustrations, the NRA sought to dissuade 
Robert A. Levy from litigating the case that became District of Columbia v. 
Heller,102 and a group of LGBT activists sought to dissuade the efforts to 
press the case Hollingsworth v. Perry,103 challenging California’s 
Proposition 8. The critics in both instances were “wrong” in the sense that 
from their preferred perspective, the Heller Court ruled favorably to the 
NRA’s interests, and the California courts created what ultimately appeared 
to many to be a strong vehicle for appealing to the Supreme Court, even 
though the end result was to dismiss the case for want of standing. But 
 
100. Any more than the Coase Theorem should be read to suggest a frictionless world. See supra 
note 78 (discussing common misreading of the Coase Theorem among law professors.) 
101. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
102. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See Adam Liptak, Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A16. 
103. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2013). See Adam Liptak, In Battle on Marriage, the 
Timing May Be Key, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at A14. 
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there is little doubt that the leadership of these interest groups thought the 
timing of the cases mattered to their ability to secure favorable rulings 
either in lower federal courts or eventually in the Supreme Court.104 
I have reviewed other instances of favorable case trajectories 
elsewhere, including most notably the NAACP decision to chip away at the 
margins of the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,105 by focusing on the most 
egregious illustrations of race-based program deprivations in higher 
education, before challenging public school desegregation head-on, and the 
decision of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and others, to challenge sex-based 
distinctions adversely affecting men in an effort to elevate scrutiny for so-
called gender distinctions under equal protection.106 In addition to these 
successful efforts to favorably order cases, we can locate within case law 
illustrations of problematic distinctions that result from efforts to avoid the 
operation of seemingly adverse precedent.107 While these are not the 
equivalent, perhaps, of a smoking gun, one that proves the butterfly 
whodunit in the past, they are akin to fossils suggesting something 
profound about the makings of a longstanding evolutionary path, one that 
social choice theory helps to unpack and explain. 
D. Standing’s Bidirectional Nature 
The critiques by Professor Siegel and Professor Elliott of the social 
choice account of standing further fail to account for the bidirectional 
nature of standing rules in affecting case timing. In fairness, I have not 
focused on this aspect in prior works, and this feature of the model creates 
the basis for distinguishing my largely positive account of standing 
doctrine from Professor Pushaw’s related normative account. Elliott 
maintains that because standing rules tend to favor regulated industries, this 
affords standing to interests with greater access to political power as 
compared with private individuals who typically lack such access.108 
Broadly viewed, Elliott anticipates that a firm within a regulated 
industry will likely have standing to challenge an imposed regulation 
because the regulation will produce identifiable costs, thus meeting the 
constitutional prerequisites of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 
 
104. For an interesting study of the settlement, funded by interest groups, see Piscataway v. 
Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997), to avoid an anticipated adverse precedent, see Lisa Estrada, Buying the 
Status Quo on Affirmative Action: The Piscataway Settlement and Its Lessons About Interest Group 
Path Manipulation, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 207 (1999). 
105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
106. STEARNS, supra note 15, at 190. 
107. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–92 (1988) (recasting executive removal cases from 
expressing a clear rule based on nature of appointment and functions to expressing a balancing test 
whereby inquiry goes to affect of removal limitation on the executive functioning). 
108. Elliott, supra note 25, at 491–92. 
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By contrast, beneficiaries of the same regulation, those who, for example, 
enjoy cleaner air or water or who benefit from the protection of endangered 
species or their habitats, are less likely to have standing to ensure that the 
regulation is enforced to the extent required by law. 
There is certainly some historical support for Elliott’s concern. During 
the Progressive Era, Justice Brandeis and then-Professor Frankfurter 
conceived standing largely with this sort of dynamic in mind.109 The goal 
was not necessarily to advantage regulated industries as such, but rather it 
was to limit the overall class of potential litigants seeking to challenge the 
increasingly aggressive regulatory state. As Judge Fletcher observed in his 
article, the earliest standing cases created presumptive rules that mirrored 
common law understandings of traditional litigation.110 Industries subject to 
regulation fit the traditional adjudicatory pattern of suits resembling those 
that might arise in tort, contract, or property more so than suits claiming 
that regulated firms were thwarting the terms of regulations designed to 
protect diffuse interests of the general public. And indeed, one problem 
with such diffuse harms is that they stand opposed to those of others in the 
general public who benefit from the ability of businesses foisting the harm 
to thereby produce goods and services at lower cost. In effect, the interests 
of regulatory beneficiaries stand opposed to those of consumers who are 
more focused on price, even when costs are externalized, than on the 
consequences of those externalities. Today, we would say that the suits 
presented by affected firms satisfy the characteristic features of injury, 
causation, and redressability. In the Progressive Era, however, the framing 
was instead intended to reduce opportunities for litigating challenges to 
regulatory reform. So viewed, these new standing rules did not create the 
power of firms to sue; that was preexisting. Rather, they curbed the ability 
of others more generally—firms lacking cases analogous to those existing 
at common law, and others lacking a direct connection at all—to sue. 
These rules were presumptive, and Fletcher demonstrated that in the 
early incarnation of standing, Congress had the wherewithal to alter that 
presumption.111 Thus, by statute, Congress could generally restrict standing 
even where in the absence of a statute, an injury analogous to one 
recognized at common law would have been recognized as cognizable, and 
conversely, it could confer standing where no such common law analogue 
existed. This, in part, distinguishes the views of Judge Fletcher and Justice 
Scalia, who instead construed standing to protect executive enforcement 
authority, as opposed to protecting congressional policymaking in 
 
109. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice, supra note 15, at 396–98. 
110. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 224. 
111. Id. at 222–23. 
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monitoring the executive branch.112 Allen v. Wright lends support to 
Fletcher’s view inasmuch as Justice O’Connor claimed that standing’s 
separation of powers foundations imply a judicial policy against stepping 
on Congress’s toes, thus risking undermining its monitoring function 
concerning the IRS policy.113 
As a descriptor of the class of persons currently empowered to sue, 
however, the claim that it uniquely protects those with access to the 
corridors of power is less obvious. Consider, for example, the famous line 
of affirmative action cases. In such cases as Bakke,114 Gratz,115 and 
Grutter,116 for example, individual litigants were afforded standing against 
major academic institutions. Undoubtedly, the University of California at 
Davis School of Medicine, the University of Michigan, and the University 
of Michigan School of Law, respectively, had far greater access to such 
corridors of power than the individuals who sought to curb their allegedly 
illegal race-conscious admissions policies. To be sure, as a matter of 
ideology, these challenges might be viewed as coming from the “right” 
because they challenge the allegedly benign use of race-based policies. 
However, Professor Elliott’s argument does not appear to be grounded in 
the particular ideological valence of the underlying constitutional claims. 
Rather, it is grounded in an inquiry into who, among various potential 
claimants, intuitively holds the greater levers of political access. 
One might dismiss the affirmative action cases as a kind of quirk in the 
standing system. But that would be mistaken. Even if we set those cases 
aside, the criminal procedure cases provide an even more profound 
counterexample to Elliott’s access-to-power thesis. As previously shown, 
in the context of juror exclusions, the Court has contorted its standing rules 
to confer standing upon white criminal defendants—an even more striking 
group in terms of lacking access to channels of power—to challenge the 
exclusion of African-American jurors despite the fact that there appears not 
to be an injury—members of the defendant’s race were not excluded—and 
if there is an injury, that injury rests with the excluded juror, who is a third 
party.117 So if a private-rights view of standing consistently favors 
empowered interests, the Supreme Court, contrary to Elliott’s thesis, 
appears to have gotten it wrong. 
The problem, however, lies in the critique, not the standing rules. The 
private-rights model does not mean that either empowered groups or 
 
112. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 15, at 1325. 
113. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 
15, at 1325. 
114. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
115. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
117. See supra note 57 and cases therein. 
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upstart individuals are systematically preferred. Rather, it means that 
whatever the claim and whoever the claimant, the Court’s standing rules 
are more likely to treat the case as justiciable if it appears that the primary 
motivation is to gain relief, not to create law. And this holds true for 
individual as well as corporate litigants. Moreover, the social choice 
account of standing suggests that the doctrine is designed to push 
controversies in the direction of Congress, which has the wherewithal not 
to force a decision.118 An implication of this—one that is consistent with 
Fletcher’s original thesis and contrary to Scalia’s—is that Congress also 
has the power to broaden standing by statute, including by conferring it on 
persons who (as Justice Marshall famously observed) would lack a 
justiciable injury in the absence of the statute.119 
Given that the social choice account of standing is critical of Lujan 
while it embraces Allen and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,120 once again, 
the model is not siding with any particular type of claimant, and certainly 
not corporate over individual. Rather, the model demonstrates the benefit 
of grounding standing rules in particular kinds of legal claims: those that 
are structured to afford relief, at least as a formal matter, rather than to 
create law. 
This analysis further relates to the recent study of standing by Professor 
Robert Pushaw. Standing rules are generally expressed in terms of litigant 
restrictions; absent the constitutional prerequisites to standing—injury in 
fact, causation, redressability—or in the presence of a prudential constraint 
(a third party or diffuse claim most notably), litigants lack standing to press 
their claims in federal courts. This can just as easily be flipped to say that 
when litigants meet these prerequisites—injury in fact, causation, 
redressability—and are not subject to the most common prudential 
constraints—third-party or diffuse harm—they can press their claims in 
federal court. And most notably, they can do so regardless of whatever 
subjective motivations they may have. 
Consider once more the cases of Bakke, Gratz and Grutter. We might 
think that Bakke, the litigant, was motivated to attend U.C. Davis Medical 
School because that was his best opportunity to become a physician. He 
might have lacked options to travel elsewhere in California, the United 
States, or the world to fulfill that goal. Or perhaps the standards of 
admission, and also the tuition, were relatively more congenial at Davis 
than at other, relatively more competitive, medical schools to which he 
 
118. STEARNS, supra note 15; Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest, supra note 15. 
119. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“It is, of course, true that 
‘Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render advisory opinions[.]’ But 
Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though 
no injury would exist without the statute.”) (citation omitted). 
120. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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might otherwise have applied. For whatever reason or combination of 
reasons, he wished to be admitted to Davis to become a doctor. 
What if, by contrast, Gratz and Grutter, again the litigants, instead 
chose to apply specifically to the University of Michigan, as an 
undergraduate and law student respectively, not because it was their 
preferred choice for academic advancement, but rather for the specific 
purpose of creating a vehicle through which to defeat Michigan’s race-
based affirmative action?121 As Professor Siegel has rightly noted: 
“Ideologically interested parties are permitted to place themselves in 
harm’s way in order to suffer an injury that can serve as the basis for 
standing.”122 Professor Pushaw’s thesis, which seeks to have the courts 
construe standing limits to ensure that litigants press claims resulting from 
fortuitous circumstances beyond their control,123 implies that these sorts of 
practices, designed to circumvent standing rules, are potentially 
problematic on that very ground. If the purpose of standing doctrine is to 
encourage fortuity, then the ability of litigants to create justiciable factual 
case predicates, especially if the true motive is the precedent, not the 
dispute resolution, is disturbing. But in the social choice model, these or 
other standing rules can affect relative case orderings in both directions, 
holding some claims off-limits and creating conditions under which some 
litigants can, by placing themselves in harm’s way, create a suitable factual 
predicate for standing in others. 
These affirmative litigant efforts likewise have a profound impact on 
developing case law, and in fact, there are examples of recently decided 
cases that interested litigants have tried to stifle. This certainly includes 
Hollingsworth v. Perry. The distaste for cases that satisfy the requirements 
of standing matters no more to standing than the taste for cases that do not 
satisfy them. Cases in both directions can affect the ultimate development 
of substantive constitutional doctrine. 
E. Standing and the Value of Precedent 
Professor Siegel further maintains that a difficulty with the social 
choice account is that the timing-based justification for standing fails to 
appreciate that the true basis for the controversies respecting the delayed 
resolution of cases he identifies—for example, Griswold, Roe, Bakke—
were the merits of the outcomes, as opposed to the peculiarities of their 
 
121. To be clear, I am not making this claim about these particular litigants. Rather, I am making 
a hypothetical assumption to explore an analytical point about the cases they were afforded standing to 
press. 
122. Siegel, supra note 25, at 115. 
123. See Pushaw, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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timing.124 That is almost certainly true. The problem, however, is that the 
observation better serves the social choice theory of standing than Siegel’s 
critique. 
Consider that the same observation would have applied had each of 
those cases come out the other way: holding that married couples can 
legally be barred from contraceptive access; that women have no 
fundamental right to terminate unwanted pregnancies; and that universities 
are free to set up racial quotas, all consistently with the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. These counter-factual 
results likewise would be subject to the observation that whenever they 
were issued, the primary opposition to them would have been the merits, 
not the timing. Controversial cases, after all, can be defined as those that, 
regardless of outcome, garner substantial opposition on the other side. The 
question, however, is not what makes these cases controversial; rather, it is 
whether relaxed justiciability norms would have undermined their 
legitimacy. And that, too, is almost certainly true. 
If the timing of these cases were governed by nothing more than the 
desire of the litigants to place them before a seemingly attractive Court, the 
very fact that they were controversial would have created enormous pent-
up opposition not only to the outcomes but also to the legitimacy of the 
ruling. When Justice O’Connor discussed Roe as constructing a 
compromise that settles a contentious question,125 the claim is only strong 
to the extent that the process of decision legitimates the substantive ruling, 
however controversial that ruling happens to be. If the question “why 
now?” could not credibly be answered other than with the refrain “because 
now is when we have a better chance at winning,” then this will undermine 
any claim to ongoing normative legitimacy when those conditions change. 
If the normative rationale governing the outcome is timing, the rejoinder 
becomes “yes, until the tables turn such that now is when we have a better 
chance at winning.” The social choice account does not suggest that 
observers are focused on relative timing—quite the opposite. To the extent 
that standing rules render outcomes more legitimate—because the timing is 
not manipulated—concerns about timing are less likely to be part of the 
public discourse. In other words, the very fact that pent-up opposition is not 
about standing merely reflects that standing is doing its job. 
 
124. Siegel, supra note 25, at 122–23. 
125. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (“Where, in the 
performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of 
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a 
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end 
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”). 
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F. A Final Tale: Windsor and Hollingsworth 
Since this Article was originally written, the central debate into which 
it has ventured—whether to view the judiciary’s role essentially as 
announcing legal rules, with cases as justificatory vehicles for the task, or 
alternatively as resolving cases or controversies, with rule announcement as 
a byproduct—played itself out in two high-profile Supreme Court cases. 
The two cases, United States v. Windsor,126 and Hollingsworth v. Perry,127 
issued on the same day, each involved same-sex marriage. The primary 
factor that complicated standing in these cases was that the original 
governmental defendants in each case had declined to defend the 
challenged enactments on appeal. 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy writing for a 5–4 
majority, found standing despite agreement by the nominal opponents in 
the case that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which restricted 
marriage for federal law purposes to unions of one man and one woman, 
was unconstitutional, and proceeded to strike that provision down.128 In 
Hollingsworth, a procedurally complex case, the Supreme Court, with 
Chief Justice Roberts writing for a 5–4 majority, held that the sponsors of 
California’s Proposition 8, which disallowed a union between members of 
the same sex to be formally recognized as a “marriage” under California 
law, lacked standing to appeal a ruling striking down Proposition 8. It held 
this despite a certified California Supreme Court ruling affording initiative 
sponsors the authority “to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity” in court when the relevant state officials have declined to do so.129 
Although the Windsor opinions followed along somewhat predictable 
ideological lines, with Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, and with Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas dissenting, the 
Hollingsworth lineup thwarted such ideological conventions, with Chief 
Roberts’s majority opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, and with Justice Kennedy’s dissent joined by Justices Thomas, 
Alito, and Sotomayor. 
In Windsor, the petitioner, who had married a same-sex spouse in 
Canada who later died, challenged Section 3 of DOMA as applied to an 
estate tax. Windsor claimed that the obligation to pay the estate tax, from 
which an otherwise similarly situated widow of an opposite-sex spouse 
would be exempt, violated her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. The 
 
126. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
127. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
128. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688, 2696. 
129. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–68. 
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Obama administration agreed with the merits of a district court opinion that 
struck down Section 3, but nonetheless chose to enforce the statute and to 
file a notice of appeal, albeit without defending the statute on the merits. 
Instead, the administration claimed an executive interest in providing 
interested members of Congress a full and fair opportunity to defend the 
challenged law, thus paving the way for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives to intervene and defend 
DOMA before the Supreme Court. 
After concluding that adverseness was a prudential, rather than 
constitutional, standing constraint, Justice Kennedy determined that this 
unusual case posture did not defeat standing, stating: 
[I]f the Executive’s agreement with a plaintiff that a law is 
unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review, then the 
Supreme Court’s primary role in determining the constitutionality 
of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff who has brought 
a justiciable legal claim would become only secondary to the 
President’s. This would undermine the clear dictate of the 
separation-of-powers principle that “when an Act of Congress is 
alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.’”130 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia rejoined: 
The Court is eager—hungry—to tell everyone its view of the legal 
question at the heart of this case. Standing in the way is an 
obstacle, a technicality of little interest to anyone but the people of 
We the People, who created it as a barrier against judges’ intrusion 
into their lives. They gave judges, in Article III, only the “judicial 
Power,” a power to decide not abstract questions but real, concrete 
“Cases” and “Controversies.” Yet the plaintiff and the Government 
agree entirely on what should happen in this lawsuit. They agree 
that the court below got it right; and they agreed in the court below 
that the court below that one got it right as well. What, then, are we 
doing here?131 
Scalia continued: 
Windsor won below, and so cured her injury, and the President was 
glad to see it. True, says the majority, but judicial review must 
 
130. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2666–68 (citation omitted). 
131. Id. at 2698 (emphasis omitted). 
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march on regardless, lest we “undermine the clear dictate of the 
separation-of-powers principle that when an Act of Congress is 
alleged to conflict with the Constitution, it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.” 
That is jaw-dropping. It is an assertion of judicial supremacy over 
the people’s Representatives in Congress and the Executive. It 
envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the 
apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional 
questions, always and everywhere “primary” in its role.132 
In Hollingsworth, after the California Supreme Court had found a right 
to same-sex marriage, the State adopted an initiative limiting marriage to 
one man and one woman. Two women seeking to be married filed suit in 
federal district court, seeking to have the proposition struck down, naming 
various state officials as defendants. As in Windsor, the relevant officials, 
this time of California, declined to defend the challenged law, instead 
allowing the initiative sponsors to do so. After a federal district court ruling 
permanently enjoined the operation of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit 
certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether the 
initiative sponsors were authorized to assert the state’s interest for purposes 
of defending the initiative in court. The California Supreme Court ruled 
that they could, and the Ninth Circuit then proceeded to affirm the district 
court’s decision on the merits. 
In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a majority, 
determined the initiative sponsors lacked Article III standing, stating: 
[O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by the voters, the measure 
became “a duly enacted constitutional amendment or statute.” 
Petitioners have no role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement 
of Proposition 8. . . . (petitioners do not “possess any official 
authority . . . to directly enforce the initiative measure in 
question”). They therefore have no “personal stake” in defending 
its enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of 
every citizen of California.133 
This time writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy responded: 
The Court’s reasoning does not take into account the fundamental 
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in 
California, which uses this mechanism to control and to bypass 
 
132. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
133. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (citations omitted). 
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public officials—the same officials who would not defend the 
initiative, an injury the Court now leaves unremedied.134 
My preliminary assessment is that although the standing issue in 
Windsor is somewhat more difficult, the Supreme Court confused 
foundational standing principles in both cases. And the reasons have much 
to do with the central focus of this Article and specifically whether we view 
the judicial function as tied to a private-or public-rights model. 
With respect to Hollingsworth, if a state has an initiative process, it 
must be permitted to establish an external means of defending the outcome 
of that lawmaking process, which, after all, is designed precisely to bypass 
elected public officials in policymaking, when those officials are unwilling 
to defend the challenged law. Although I have previously expressed 
skepticism of voter initiatives, at least in some circumstances,135 that issue 
is separate from how successfully adopted initiatives can be defended in the 
judicial process. There was certainly a clear controversy that needed to be 
resolved in Hollingsworth, and the only question—one that the California 
Supreme Court answered for state law purposes, albeit not for purposes of 
Article III standing—was whether, in the absence of a willing state official 
to undertake the task, some other party could be so designated. The 
California Supreme Court’s affirmative answer to that question should have 
sufficed to allow a genuine and ongoing dispute between the State of 
California and a couple seeking access to same-sex marriage to reach a 
final disposition as to the constitutional status of a law affecting the 
couple’s claimed rights. 
And with respect to Windsor, it is quite clear that the Obama 
administration sought to have the wedding cake it was eating. If the 
administration wanted to concede error and thus claim that the law was 
unconstitutional, it should have paid the price of not receiving a Supreme 
Court imprimatur of its policy choice. Conversely, if it wanted the benefit 
of a Supreme Court ruling one way or the other, it should have defended 
DOMA as a properly enacted federal statute, setting aside its normative 
views on the merits. What makes Windsor more difficult than 
Hollingsworth is that if the administration continued to enforce the law but 
remained unwilling to defend it, then that peculiar legal posture risked 
leaving other same-sex spouses (or widows or widowers) seeking to benefit 
from relevant federal statutory protections in a sort of Catch-22. Individual 
litigants could press for case-specific relief challenging the application of 
Section 3, but given the administration’s stance—continuing to enforce 
DOMA but not defending it—each judicial victory of its own force 
 
134. Id. at 2668. 
135. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
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prevents the ruling from becoming the predicate to a beneficial precedent. 
It is perhaps for this very reason that the administration’s legal posture in 
Windsor was so problematic. 
On one reading, these cases support a political view of standing. One 
majority wanted to get to the DOMA question, and another sought to duck 
the Proposition 8 question. This thesis, which is nearly impossible to 
disprove, might help to explain the peculiar judicial alignment in 
Hollingsworth. Perhaps one or more of the liberal jurists who joined the 
majority decision denying standing, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan, 
feared that if standing were granted, a majority would have sustained 
Proposition 8 on the merits. And yet, assuming that an eventual merits 
ruling on Proposition 8 followed along more conventional ideological lines, 
this theory implies that Justice Kennedy, the author of the three most 
significant cases for same-sex relationships or conduct, Romer, Lawrence, 
and now Windsor, would have drawn the line just shy of protecting access 
to the label “marriage.” And consider that if Justice Kennedy believed that 
the law dictated such a ruling, however problematic in light of his larger 
related jurisprudence, he could have easily delayed making those views 
known by joining the majority’s standing denial, rather than authoring 
Hollingsworth’s standing dissent. 
There is another, potentially more generous, if ironic, account that in 
some sense aligns with the social choice analysis of standing. Perhaps some 
who joined the Hollingsworth majority thought that the case for a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage would be strengthened if the 
precedents related to same-sex relationships or conduct continued to 
develop incrementally, rather than ending in one swoop. As the precedents 
line up over a period of years, first Romer, then Lawrence, then Windsor, 
the legitimacy of an eventual same-sex marriage ruling might appear 
stronger. The irony, of course, is that this implicit suggestion of judicial 
modesty, at least in terms of favoring incrementalism, came at the price of 
two seemingly problematic, and frankly non-modest, standing decisions. 
And more to the point, it came at the price of having the Supreme Court 
use standing, a doctrine designed to limit litigant manipulation of case 
orderings with an eye toward effectuating desired precedent, to manipulate 
case orderings itself toward the very same goal. 
One might write off Windsor as an isolated anomaly given the Obama 
administration’s unusual strategy. That is harder to do with Hollingsworth. 
That standing precedent, after all, holds significant implications for states 
that rely on direct democracy to circumvent legislative lawmaking 
processes, especially when those processes are used to enact the very 
policies that elected officials are unwilling to embrace. And if we think of 
state law as having an existence apart from legislative processes, the very 
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premise of direct democracy, the Hollingsworth precedent seems 
problematic indeed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While this Article reveals foundational disagreements among a number 
of standing scholars, it also reveals areas in which standing scholars agree: 
Each of the scholars whose works I have discussed agree that standing 
implicates fundamental questions of judicial legitimacy that lie at the core 
of constitutional judicial review. It also reveals a common appreciation for 
the contribution of then-Professor, and now Judge, William Fletcher, who 
himself struggled with these foundational questions as a legal scholar well 
before he realized he would face the actual task of applying such doctrines 
as a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Holding this conference in Judge Fletcher’s honor is fitting. It is also 
useful. It provides the basis for serious consideration not only of 
standing—a topic certainly important in its own right—but also of whether 
we conceive the judicial function as grounded in a private-or public-rights 
model. Ultimately, this Article makes a singular claim: For those who care 
most deeply about public law precedent, there is a price to be paid when the 
foundations upon which those precedents rest are weak. Ironically, the 
social choice theory of standing reveals that those who embrace the public-
rights model might come to realize that their foundation is resting on sand. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following four tables present the overlapping data on Supreme 
Court duration. The first table provides data for the Supreme Courts based 
on shortest, longest, and average tenure (expressed in months), in addition 
to harmonic mean136 and the most common tenure, from 1953 through 
2010. The second graphic provides the duration of each natural Court in 
succession by months from the Vinson Court in 1946 to the Roberts Court 
in 2010, and the third and fourth tables provide the same data in bar graph 
and chart form, respectively.137 
 
 
Typology Court Value (in months) 
Shortest Tenure Warren 1969–1969 1 
Longest Tenure Rehnquist 1994–2005 133 




















136. The harmonic mean represents the mean value after excluding the outliers, which in this 
instance are the one-month natural Court during the Warren Court era and the 133-month natural Court 
during the Rehnquist Court era. This harmonic mean is primarily valuable in demonstrating that the 
longevity of the 133-month Rehnquist Court period substantially extended the harmonic mean of 9 
months to an average tenure of 25.6 months. 
137. The changes in the Court were collected from the website OYEZ, while filtering out non-
material changes to the make-up of the Court, including, most notably, changes that occurred during the 
summer months when the Court was not in session. This avoids counting as a natural Court the changed 
composition following a justice’s retirement, but before a successor joins the Court. See Justices, OYEZ, 
http://www.oyez.org/courts/robt6. For example, the Rehnquist Court from 1988–90 was calculated as 
lasting thirty months, beginning when Justice Kennedy joined in February 1988 until Justice Souter 
joined in August 1990. To err on the side of longevity in calculating the duration of a natural court, it 
also included the summer months following Justice Brennan’s retirement in June 1990. Although the 
chart uses simplifying calculations, it does provide a listing of natural Courts that coincides with those 
in the Supreme Court database. See Analysis Specifications, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php. 
4 STEARNS 349-401 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2013 4:12 PM 
400 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:2:349 
Natural Court Number of Months 
Vinson 1946–49 36 
Vinson 1949–53 48 
Warren 1953–54 12 
Warren 1954–55 5 
Warren 1955–56 19 
Warren 1956–57 5 
Warren 1957–58 19 
Warren 1958–62 42 
Warren 1962–62 6 
Warren 1962–65 36 
Warren 1965–67 24 
Warren 1967–69 19 
Warren 1969–69 1 
Burger 1969–70 12 
Burger 1970–71 15 
Burger 1971–72 4 
Burger 1972–75 36 
Burger 1975–75 11 
Burger 1975–81 69 
Burger 1981–86 60 
Rehnquist 1986–87 9 
Rehnquist 1987–88 8 
Rehnquist 1988–90 30 
Rehnquist 1990–91 12 
Rehnquist 1991–93 24 
Rehnquist 1993–94 12 
Rehnquist 1994–2005 133 
Roberts 2005–06 4 
Roberts 2006–09 44 
Roberts 2009–10 12 
Table 2 
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